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Abstract:  The following comparison was writ-
ten for the first meeting of the International Law As-
sociation newly established (2010) Committee on In-
tellectual Property and Private International Law 
(Chair: Professor Toshiyuki Kono, Kyushu University; 
Co-Rapporteurs: Professors Pedro de Miguel Asensio, 
Madrid Complutense University, and Axel Metzger, 
Hannover University) (hereinafter: ILA Committee), 
which was hosted at the Faculty of Law of the Uni-
versity of Lisbon in March 16-17, 2012. The compari-
son 
at stake concerns the rules on infringement and ex-
clusive (subject-mater) jurisdiction posed (or rejected, 
in case of exclusive jurisdiction) by four sets of aca-
demic principles. Notwithstanding the fact that the 
rules in question present several differences, those 
differences in the majority of cases could be over-
come by further studies and work of the ILA Commit-
tee, as the following comparison explains.
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A. Introduction
1 The following pages compare the rules on 
infringement and exclusive (subject-matter) 
jurisdiction posed (or rejected) by four sets of 
academic principles, namely the ALI Principles 
Governing Jurisdiction, Choice of Law, and 
Judgments in Transnational Disputes, adopted on 14 
May 2007 (will be referred to as the ALI Principles); 
the “Principles for Conflict of Laws in Intellectual 
Property, prepared by the  European Max Planck 
Group on Conflict of Laws in Intellectual Property 
(CLIP)”,  published on 31 August 2011 (will be 
referred to as the CLIP Principles); the “Transparency 
of Japanese Law Project, Transparency Proposal 
on Jurisdiction, Choice of Law, Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Intellectual 
Property” finalised in 2009 (will be referred to as the 
Transparency Proposal); the “Principles of Private 
International Law on Intellectual Property Rights, 
Joint Proposal Drafted by Members of the Private 
International Law Association of Korea and Japan 
(Joint University Global COE Project)”, of 14 October 
2010 (will be referred to as the Joint Korean and 
Japanese Proposal). The comparison demonstrates a 
trend of all sets of principles to mitigate and even to 
overcome the territorial approach, in favour of the 
consolidation of claims in cross-border intellectual 
property rights disputes.
B. Infringement Jurisdiction 
in Intellectual Property
I. PIL method adopted 
1. Differences
2 The Transparency Proposal adopts a unilateral PIL 
method which determines only when Japanese 
courts will have international jurisdiction to hear 
a claim, but does not determine which other State’s 
courts may also have jurisdiction for the same 
claim. The ALI Principles, the CLIP Principles and 
the Joint Korean and Japanese Proposal all adopt 
a multilateral method, which does address when 
national and foreign courts will have jurisdiction.
2. Rationale
3 The Transparency Proposal primarily aims at the 
reform of current Japanese law, particularly with 
respect to international jurisdiction,1 while the other 
sets of Principles seek universal Principles on issues 
concerning international IPRs law. Thus, the former 
adopts a unilateral method, while the latter adopts 
a multilateral approach. 
3. International Context
4 The multilateral conventions on international 
jurisdiction typically seek universal Principles and 
therefore adopt a multilateral approach. 
4. Discussion
5 The Transparency Proposal adopts a unilateral 
approach, which does not give an answer to 
the question of which court has international 
jurisdiction to address the case at stake when the 
forum state courts do not have such jurisdiction. 
While unilateralism is necessary for national rules 
on international jurisdiction, it is not suitable for 
international rules on the same topic. 
6 By contrast, the ALI Principles, the CLIP Principles, 
and the Joint Korean and Japanese Proposal each 
adopt a multilateral approach for determining 
jurisdiction.  Thus, each of these provide an answer 
for which other court(s) would have jurisdiction 
even if the forum state in question lacks jurisdiction. 
An international consensus is needed if the 
problems of cross-border litigation are going to be 
adequately addressed and these proposals, by taking 
a multilateral approach, are more likely to be helpful 
in finding a unified international solution. Also, 
the multilateral approach is supported by the 2001 
Draft of the Hague Judgment Convention, in Article 
10 on Torts, which clearly envisages international 
litigation and sets out guidelines for which courts 
will have jurisdiction.2 
II. Notion of infringement
1. Differences
7 The CLIP Principles (in Article 2:202) and the 
Transparency Proposal (in Article 105) are explicit 
that jurisdiction extends not only to infringement, 
but also to threatened infringements.  In contrast, the 
Joint Korean and Japanese Proposal, by referring to 
“infringement occurs”, in Article 203, does not make 
provision for cases of threatened infringements.  The 
wording of the ALI Principles, in Section 204, does 
not make it clear whether a forum State could have 
jurisdiction over an infringement claim when the 
infringement is only threatened.  
8 All sets of Principles do not characterise the notion 
of infringement on the basis of the magnitude of 
the harm caused or the degree of fault involved, 
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but instead insert escape clauses, which will be 
addressed in paragraph B.IV.
9 The 2001 Draft of the Hague Judgment Convention 
supports the approach taken by the CLIP Principles 
and the Transparency Proposal, as outlined in 
paragraphs B.II.3 and B.II.4 below. 
2. Rationale
10 The CLIP Principles and the Transparency Proposal 
provide for jurisdiction in cases of infringement as 
well as in cases of threatened infringement. The 
Comments to the Transparency Proposal highlight 
that this rule is necessary since “if no preventive 
measure could be taken – for example, in cases where 
infringing actions via Internet or the flow of pirate 
products from an off-shore production site are surely 
foreseen – damages could be huge. The author is of 
the opinion that in such cases preventive measures 
should be taken. The Transparency Proposal 
therefore includes ‘the place where results of an 
intellectual property infringement are to occur’ and 
‘an infringing act is to take place’.”3 It is reasonable 
to assume similar reasoning was behind the granting 
of jurisdiction over threatened infringements in the 
CLIP Principles.
11 In contrast, the Joint Korean and Japanese 
Proposal does not make provision for threatened 
infringements, and the wording of the ALI Principles 
is not clear on whether a forum State could have 
jurisdiction over a threatened infringement. The 
reason for this is not given. 
12 As a matter of principle, the term “infringement” 
in all sets of Principles is not qualified either with 
respect to the magnitude of the harm caused or the 
degree of fault involved. This means that according 
to the basic rule in each of the sets of Principles 
(found in Article 2:202 of the CLIP Principles, 
Article 105 of the Transparency Proposal, Article 
203 of the Joint Korean and Japanese Proposal and 
Section 204 of the ALI Principles), jurisdiction could 
in principle be established in countries where the 
infringement only occurs accidentally, and has only 
minimal effect. In order to avoid such results, which 
could be grossly disproportional to the infringing 
activity and/or harm caused, each set of Principles 
has an escape clause under which jurisdiction will 
be denied if certain requirements are met, and 
those requirements vary with respect to each set 
of Principles. 
3. International Context
13 The 2001 Hague Draft Convention includes the 
notion of threatened infringements, in Article 10(4), 
where it says “[a] plaintiff may also bring an action 
in accordance with paragraph 1 when the act or 
omission, or the injury may occur.” This approach is 
in line with the CLIP Principles and the Transparency 
Proposal, as mentioned above. Furthermore, the 
Hague Draft Convention supports all of the sets 
of Principles by not characterizing the notion of 
infringement in terms of harm caused or degree 
of fault involved either. However, the Convention 
does have an escape clause, in Article 10(3), which 
says that “where the defendant has taken reasonable 
steps to avoid acting in or directing activity into that 
State” then that State will not have jurisdiction.
4. Discussion
14 The CLIP Principles and the Transparency Proposal 
are explicit that jurisdiction extends not only to 
infringement, but also to threatened infringements.  In 
contrast, the Joint Korean and Japanese Proposal, by 
referring to “infringement occurred,” does not make 
provision for jurisdiction in cases of threatened 
infringements.  The wording of the ALI Principles 
does not make clear whether a forum State could 
have jurisdiction over an infringement claim when 
the infringement is only threatened. The approach 
of the first two proposals is preferable since the 
advantages typically connected with establishing 
jurisdiction in the country where the infringing 
activity already occurred are also pertinent in the 
case of threatened infringement. Even though the 
situation differs insofar as infringing items will not 
be found on the market, indicia for a threat being 
imminent will regularly be accessible at the place 
or the places where the relevant preparations are 
taken.4
15 The approach taken by the CLIP Principles and the 
Transparency Proposal of including threatened 
infringements is also supported by the 2001 Draft 
of the Hague Judgment Convention.5 Article 10(4) 
states that the plaintiff may also “bring an action […] 
when the act or omission, or the injury may occur.”
16 In contrast, even though the term “infringement” 
in all sets of Principles is not qualified either with 
respect to the magnitude of the harm caused or the 
degree of fault involved, each set of Principles poses 
an escape clause under which jurisdiction will be 
denied if certain requirements are met, in order to 
avoid establishing jurisdiction in countries where 
the infringement only occurs accidentally, and 
has only minimal effect. The escape clauses will be 
discussed in paragraph B.IV.4.
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III. Territoriality
1. Differences
17 All sets of Principles are grounded on the premise 
that IPRs infringements are torts.6 International 
jurisdiction in tort cases is usually grounded at the 
place of the harmful act as well as at the place of 
the produced effect. However, the CLIP Principles 
do not apply such a distinction in intellectual 
property matters due to the territorial structure of 
intellectual property rights, which does not allow 
for the establishment of jurisdiction in a State 
where the right is not protected. In fact, the CLIP 
Principles determine the place of the infringement 
activity as always coincident with the place of the 
infringement results, due to the territorial nature of 
IPRs (see Article 2:202, which says “[A] person may 
be sued in the courts of the State where the alleged 
infringement occurs or may occur…”). Yet, the CLIP 
Principles do mitigate the territorial approach by 
adopting a more “effects–oriented approach”. 
Under this approach, the infringing conduct that 
has taken place in a certain State (and so can base 
the infringement jurisdiction in that State) is also 
required to have been directed to that State.7 
18 In contrast, all other sets of Principles adopt 
the jurisdiction criteria of general torts for IPRs 
infringements cases, namely by granting jurisdiction 
to the courts at the place of the infringement activity 
or at the place of the infringement results, the latter 
being hypothetically different from the former.
19 The 2001 Draft of the Hague Judgment Convention 
also supports the jurisdiction criteria of general 
torts, as is discussed below in paragraph B.III.4.
2. Rationale
20 All sets of Principles save the CLIP Principles allow 
for the establishment of jurisdiction at the place 
where the infringement activities took place as well 
as at the place where the infringing results occurred. 
Thus, even though the Comments to the Joint Korean 
and Japanese Proposal refer to the territoriality 
principle, the same Comments interpret the category 
of infringement in conformity with the ubiquity 
theory.  
21 The territorial approach of the CLIP Principles is 
explained by the fact that an IPRs infringement 
differs than a traditional tort since any conduct can 
infringe an IPRs that does not actually exist where 
the conduct is perpetrated. So, for instance should 
the protection of an Italian IPR be invoked before 
a US court by reason of the fact that the uploading 
activity took place in the US, the US court should 
consider that the right to be protected is an Italian 
right, that this right does not exist in the US, that 
it is not possible to infringe something that does 
not exist, that the activity at stake is therefore 
not an infringing activity, and that the US court 
cannot ground its jurisdiction on the Italian IPR 
infringement. In summary, the infringing activities 
can only be the first activities of the series of 
conducts that take place in the state where the IPR 
to be protected exists. As a consequence, the place 
where the injuries occur can only be coincident with 
the place where the activities initiating those injuries 
occur, and can be localized in the State where the IPR 
to be protected exists.8 The territoriality principle 
therefore highly influences the CLIP Principles 
infringement jurisdiction. 
22 Yet, the influence of the territoriality principle on 
the CLIP Principles is mitigated in several ways. 
First, the territoriality principle is intended as an 
expression of the proximity principle, since under 
the CLIP Principles it is suitable to determine the best 
placed court to adjudicate the infringement in light 
of the fact that this court is the more proximal to the 
concrete case at stake.9 Second, the CLIP Principles 
are also influenced by “the act-based conception of 
intellectual property infringements”10 under which 
“whereas traditional tort distinguishes between 
act, causation and damage, the infringement of an 
IPR requires only that the defendant committed an 
act which falls in the scope of the absolute right of 
the right holder.”11 Third, the CLIP Principles even 
adopt a more “effects–oriented approach”, under 
which the infringing conduct that can base the 
infringement jurisdiction includes the activity that 
takes place, which is directed to a certain State. 
As such the Principles implement the “directed 
to” test proper of German jurisprudence12 and the 
“commercial effects” proposed by the WIPO Joint 
Recommendation Concerning the Protection of 
Marks, and Other Industrial Property Rights in 
Signs, on the Internet, adopted by the Assembly 
of the Paris Union for the Protection of Industrial 
Property and the General Assembly of the WIPO at 
the Thirty-Sixth Series of Meetings of the Assemblies 
of the Member States of WIPO 24 September to 3 
October 2001.13 
3. International Context
23 A tendency to overcome a strict territorial approach 
is reflected by the rules on jurisdiction that do not 
consider the place of result as being coincident with 
the place of the act in the name of the territoriality 
principle, but rather extend the ubiquity theory to 
IPRs. This theory is generally adopted with respect 
to other sorts of torts and leads to the vesting of in-
ternational jurisdiction in the courts at the place of 
the act or alternatively in the courts at the place of 
the result. In the Brussels system for instance, Arti-
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cle 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation establishes that 
“a person domiciled in a Member State may, in an-
other Member State, be sued: / […] 3. in matters re-
lating to tort, delict or quasi-delict, in the courts for 
the place where the harmful event occurred or may 
occur”  In relation to this rule and to its correspond-
ing one of the Brussels Convention the ECJ has ren-
dered many different interpretative judgments. 
24 So, in the Mines de potasse case the ECJ posed the ubiq-
uity theory by maintaining that “where the place of 
the happening of the event which may give rise to 
liability in tort, delict or quasidelict and the place 
where that event results in damage are not identi-
cal, the expression ‘place where the harmful event 
occurred’, in Article 5(3) of the Convention of 27 Sep-
tember 1968 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial matters, must 
be understood as being intended to cover both the 
place where the damage occurred and the place of 
the event giving rise to it. The result is that the de-
fendant may be sued, at the option of the plaintiff, 
either in the courts for the place where the dam-
age occurred or in the courts for the place of the 
event which gives rise to and is at the origin of that 
damage.”14 
25 With particular regard to the multi-state infringe-
ments, in the Shevill decision15 the ECJ maintained 
that the expression of Article 5(3) of the Brussels I 
Regulation “place where the harmful event oc-
curred” shall be interpreted in the sense that “the 
victim of a libel by a newspaper article distributed 
in several Contracting States may bring an action 
for damages against the publisher either before the 
courts of the Contracting State of the place where 
the publisher of the defamatory publication is es-
tablished, which have jurisdiction to award dam-
ages for all the harm caused by the defamation, or 
before the courts of each Contracting State in which 
the publication was distributed and where the vic-
tim claims to have suffered injury to his reputation, 
which have jurisdiction to rule solely in respect of 
the harm caused in the State of the court seised”. 
26 In the case Olivier Martinez, Robert Martinez v So-
ciété MGN Limited the “Tribunal de Grande Instance 
de Paris” referred to the ECJ the following question 
“must Article 2 and Article 5(3) of Council Regula-
tion (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on Juris-
diction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judg-
ments in Civil and Commercial matters be interpreted 
to mean that a court or tribunal of a Member State has 
jurisdiction to hear an action brought in respect of an 
infringement of personal rights allegedly committed 
by the placing on-line of information and/or photo-
graphs on an Internet site published in another Mem-
ber State by a company domiciled in that second State 
- or in a third Member State, but in any event in a State 
other than the first Member State - : On the sole con-
dition that that Internet site can be accessed from the 
first Member State, On the sole condition that there is 
between the harmful act and the territory of the first 
Member State a link which is sufficient, substantial 
or significant and, in that case, whether that link can 
be created by: - the number of hits on the page at is-
sue made from the first Member State, as an absolute 
figure or as a proportion of all hits on that page, /- 
the residence, or nationality, of the person who com-
plains of the infringement of his personal rights or 
more generally of the persons concerned, - the lan-
guage in which the information at issue is broadcast 
or any other factor which may demonstrate the site 
publisher’s intention to address specifically the pub-
lic of the first Member State, - the place where the 
events described occurred and/or where the photo-
graphic images put on-line were taken, - other crite-
ria?”16 In other words, the ECJ was asked to deter-
mine a so called market impact rule.17 Unfortunately 
the ECJ did not answer to this question because it was 
not raised in a case pending before a court or tribunal 
of a Member State against whose decisions there is no 
judicial remedy under national law as required by Ar-
ticle 68(1) of the EC Treaty, but rather in a case where 
decisions on jurisdiction taken by the national court 
in the main proceedings were subject to appeal under 
national law.18 In the absence of an ECJ judgment on 
this problem, EU member states adopt different so-
lutions in relation to the IPRs infringement on the In-
ternet. At first, the EU member States’ national courts 
have interpreted broadly the notion of “place where 
the harmful event occurred”, which was intended to 
include the place where an Internet service could be 
downloaded. This interpretation however, has been 
superseded in more recent times, particularly in Ger-
many, starting from the Hotel Maritime judgment of 
the German Supreme Court which required websites 
to be “intentionally directed” to German users in order 
to ascertain the German courts jurisdiction.19
27 In the very recent eDate case the ECJ maintained that 
Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation “must be in-
terpreted as meaning that, in the event of an alleged 
infringement of personality rights by means of con-
tent placed online on an internet website, the per-
son who considers that his rights have been infrin-
ged has the option of bringing an action for liability, 
in respect of all the damage caused, either before the 
courts of the Member State in which the publisher 
of that content is established or before the courts of 
the Member State in which the centre of his interests 
is based. That person may also, instead of an action 
for liability in respect of all the damage caused, bring 
his action before the courts of each Member State 
in the territory of which content placed online is or 
has been accessible. Those courts have jurisdiction 
only in respect of the damage caused in the territory 
of the Member State of the court seised.”20 In other 
words, the eDate jurisprudence then poses a forum 
actoris, allowing the plaintiff to sue the defendant 
at his place. As such this jurisprudence derogates to 
2012 
Benedetta Ubertazzi
218 1
the principle at the basis of the Brussels system ac-
cording to which actor sequitur forum rei. 
28 In sum, for torts in general Article 5(3) of the Brus-
sels system as interpreted by the ECJ does not con-
sider the place of the result as being coincident with 
the place of the act, in the name of the territoria-
lity principle, but rather adopts the ubiquity theory 
leading to the vesting of international jurisdiction 
in the courts at the place of the act or alternatively 
in the courts at the place of the result. Yet, the ECJ 
for a long time did not specify if the judgments just 
recalled are extendable to IPRs infringement cases. 
Therefore, the issue was highly debated. According 
to an opinion the Shevill jurisprudence does not ap-
ply to IPRs cases by reason of their territorial nature: 
this opinion leads to a narrower scope of the court’s 
authority than the one proper of the Shevill jurispru-
dence, since the extent of both the jurisdictions at 
the place of the activity and the jurisdictions at the 
place of the result (intended in any case as being 
identical) would be territorially limited to the da-
mages localised in the forum state.21 Yet, another 
opinion adopts an opposite view and considers the 
Shevill jurisprudence extendable to IPRs cases des-
pite their territorial nature.22 In any case both opi-
nions deny the application to IPRs of the eDate juri-
sprudence on the forum actoris , sine contrary to the 
owner of sensible data, the IPR owner is the stron-
ger party of the case rather than the weaker one: it 
does not seem correct, then, to allow the stronger 
party to sue the defendant at his place. 
29 Finally, on April the 19th 2012 in the Wintersteiger23 
case the ECJ extended the judgments at stake to the 
IPRs cases, by stating that Art.5(3) of the Brussels I 
Regulation “must be interpreted as meaning that 
an action relating to infringement of a trade mark 
registered in a Member State because of the use, by 
an advertiser, of a keyword identical to that trade 
mark on a search engine website operating under 
a country-specific top-level domain of another 
Member State may be brought before either the 
courts of the Member State in which the trade mark 
is registered or the courts of the Member State of the 
place of establishment of the advertiser”. In other 
words Art. 5.3 grants jurisdiction to the courts at 
the place of registration of a trademark, in their 
quality of being the courts of the harmful event, 
and at the same time to the courts of the place of 
establishment of the person who uploaded material 
on-line, in their quality of being the courts of the 
place of the action. Furthermore, the scope of the 
courts’ authority at the place of the establishment of 
the person at stake is territorially unlimited, while 
the extension of the jurisdiction of the courts at the 
place of the registration of the trademark at stake is 
confined to the territory of the forum State. Finally, 
the Court explicitly denied the application of the 
eDate jurisprudence to the IPRs infringement cases: 
while the situation of a person who considers that 
there has been an infringement of his personality 
rights could involve more than one State, being these 
personality rights protectable in all Member States, a 
proprietor of an IPR cannot rely on the protection of 
this right outside the territory of its granting State, 
since the protection afforded by the registration of a 
national mark is, in principle, limited to the territory 
of the Member State in which it is registered24.
30 Finally, it is worth noting that according to Article 
98(2) of the Community Trade Mark Regulation, 
courts in the defendant’s country of domicile, or one 
of the other courts listed in the “cascade” of fora in 
Article 97 (1)-(4), have competence to adjudicate the 
infringement of a Community Trade Mark in its en-
tirety, but the courts in the countries where the in-
fringement occurred only have jurisdiction with re-
gard to their own territory.25 A corresponding rule 
can also be found in Article 83(2) of the Community 
Design Regulation.
31 Outside the EU frame, specifically in Japan, accor-
ding to the new Japanese Act on International Juris-
diction, an action related to a tort may be filed with 
the courts of Japan when “the tort occurred in Japan 
(except where the result of a harmful act committed 
abroad has occurred in Japan and the occurrence of 
that result in Japan would have been normally un-
foreseeable)” (Article 3-3 (viii) of Japan’s Act on In-
ternational Jurisdiction). According to the common 
understanding of this rule, “in the cases where the 
place of a harmful act and the place of the result of 
the act differ, it is sufficient if either the act or the 
result took place in Japan.”26 This rule applies also 
to IPRs, because of the absence of a specific provi-
sion on these kind of torts and the exclusion of IPRs 
infringements from the scope of exclusive jurisdic-
tion rule.27 Thus, the Japanese approach would then 
allow a Japanese court to adjudicate an infringement 
case under the infringement jurisdiction rule not-
withstanding the fact that the claim relates to a fo-
reign IPR and the defendant is not domiciled in Ja-
pan, if for instance, the results of the infringement 
are in Japan. This would not be possible according 
to the territorial approach.28 This Japanese approach 
allows for centralised jurisdiction even with regard 
to the multi-state IPRs infringements, rendering it 
possible in cases of multi-state torts to claim dama-
ges for the tort in its entirety in Japan, even if it is 
not the place where the defendant is domiciled and 
it is not the place where the action causing the harm 
was committed.29  Furthermore, in Japan, in deter-
mining the place of the result it is relevant to refer 
to the place of the effects that the alleged infringing 
act would have upon the forum, rather than to the 
physical territorial connection to the forum in line 
with the market impact approach.30 
32 Also, the ubiquity approach is adopted in China, 
where the Supreme Court’s Interpretation of Seve-
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ral Questions on the Application of Law in on-line 
Copyright Disputes Litigation of 2000 (amended in 
2006) established that for the purposes of internati-
onal jurisdiction “the place of infringement includes 
the place where the ISP, computer terminals which 
operate the alleged infringing activity are located. 
In the cases where the place of infringement […] 
cannot be ascertained, the place where the compu-
ter terminal through which the plaintiff found in-
fringing contents is located is deemed the place of 
infringement.”31
4. Discussion
33 The tendency to overcome a strict territorial appro-
ach with respect to IPRs infringement cases is evi-
dent in the four sets of Principles. In fact, all of the 
sets of Principles, except the CLIP Principles, adopt 
the ubiquity theory with respect to IPRs infringe-
ments and therefore neglect the territorial appro-
ach, allowing for jurisdiction at the place where the 
infringement activities took place or will take place 
as well as at the place where the infringing results 
occurred or might occur.32 
34 This approach is supported by the 2001 Draft of the 
Hague Judgment Convention, which outlines in Ar-
ticle 10(1) that the plaintiff may bring an action eit-
her at the place of the action, or at the place of the 
injury.33 The Nygh/Pocar Report to the Hague Judg-
ment Convention talks about this approach both en-
suring that the best placed court in each case is cho-
sen, and allowing the victim to have the benefit of 
choosing the court in light of which law will be ap-
plied.34 Also, even the CLIP Principles limit the influ-
ence of the territoriality principle on their infringe-
ment jurisdiction rule.35 In fact, the CLIP Principles 
do not refuse to apply the ubiquity theory in IPRs 
cases by reason of the territoriality principle being 
an expression of a particular nature of those rights. 
Rather the refusal to apply the ubiquity theory to 
IPRs cases originates in their understanding of the 
territoriality principle as an expression of the pro-
ximity principle, under which the most proximal 
and best placed court to adjudicate the case should 
always be the court of the country of protection of 
the IPR involved.36 The refusal to apply the ubiquity 
theory to IPRs cases by the CLIP Principles derives 
also from the act-based conception of IPRs infringe-
ment. The same refusal is also grounded in the cri-
ticism of the place of the action as an adequate ju-
risdiction criterion, particularly in Internet cases.37 
In any case, the CLIP Principles still adopt a tempe-
red territoriality approach in relation to the infrin-
gement jurisdiction because they follow an effects–
oriented approach. 
35 Finally, all the Principles in question allow (under 
different requirements) a centralised jurisdiction to 
adjudicate on the entire infringement without ter-
ritorial limitations, and heavily rely on the market 
impact rule, as will be recalled at paragraph  B.IV.4 
below.
36 The “territorial approach” with respect to in-
fringement jurisdiction of the CLIP Princip-
les has been criticised by Professor Yuko Nis-
hitani because it does not allow for the capturing 
of preparatory acts directly in the place where 
these acts are being perpetrated, when the 
IPR infringed by these preparatory acts is 
a foreign IPR. On this, see the example given supra 
in footnote 26.38
37 Professor Basedow’s comments on the issue are 
also relevant, but it is unclear whether these com-
ments are limited to ubiquitous infringements 
or can be applied more generally to the territo-
rial approach of the CLIP Principles. In his com-
ments, Professor Basedow raises the questions of 
whether there can be maintained in cases of wor-
ldwide dissemination of data the view that the 
only relevant state is the one where the IPR exists 
(in fact, if somebody uploads something in one 
country that infringes rights in other countries it 
would be reasonable to qualify the act of uploading 
as irrelevant); and the view that there is unlikely 
to be relevant evidence in the state where the 
preparatory acts take place (in fact, “in the state 
where the material is uploaded, there 
could, for instance, be witnesses who could 
testify that certain material was uploaded at a cer-
tain point in time.”)39
38 However, Doctor Heinze offers an argument in fa-
vour of the territorial confinement of jurisdiction, 
explaining that there are several objections against 
a rule that gives jurisdiction to a State in which the 
right does not even exist. One, from a dogmatic point 
of view it is odd to grant jurisdiction over an intel-
lectual property infringement to a state in which the 
right does not even exist. Second, since the purpose 
of the infringement jurisdiction rule is to grant ju-
risdiction to a court that has proximity to the evi-
dence to be presented in the case, it is assumed that 
the relevant evidence relating to the IPR infringe-
ment can be found in the State where the infringe-
ment occurred and thus in the State where the IPR 
that was allegedly infringed exists. Finally, as for the 
enforcement concerns and the need to obtain re-
dress quickly, plaintiffs can seek provisional mea-
sures in the State where the activities took place by 
relying on the special jurisdiction rules for provisi-
onal measures.40
39 Finally, it seems that the stance to be welcomed is 
the one that favours the application of the jurisdic-
tion rule on tort to claims on the infringement of 
IPRs i.e. the approach that is followed by the ALI 
Principles, the Joint Korean and Japanese Propo-
sal and the Transparency Proposal.41 This position 
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is also in line with the 2001 Draft of the Hague Judg-
ment Convention approach, as is clear by the wor-
ding of Article 10, splitting the issues of jurisdiction 
into the places where the act or omission “that cau-
sed injury” occurred, and the place where the “in-
jury arose.”42 
IV. Jurisdiction criteria, 
scope of court’s authority 
and escape clause
1. Differences
40 The ALI Principles, the Transparency Proposal and the Joint Korean and Japanese Proposal all adopt the so called ubiquity theory,43 which provides for jurisdiction at the place of the action, and at the place of the result of the infringement. 
41 With respect to the court at the place of the action, 
this court’s authority is unlimited in scope under the 
ALI Principles, but is limited under the Transparency 
and Joint Korean and Japanese Proposals. The place 
of the action does not provide a sufficient forum to 
exercise jurisdiction in cases of ubiquitous infringe-
ments under the Transparency Proposal, unless the 
results are maximized in Japan, and under the Joint 
Korean and Japanese Proposal, the place of the ac-
tion does not provide a sufficient forum to exercise 
jurisdiction in cases of multistate infringements, un-
less the major part of the alleged infringer’s activi-
ties occurred in the forum state. 
42 To be more precise, the ALI Principles establish that 
where the court is situated in the place where the 
defendant has substantially acted, or taken substan-
tial preparatory acts, to initiate or to further an alle-
ged infringement, the court has jurisdiction and its 
jurisdiction extends to claims respecting all injuries 
arising out of the conduct, wherever the injuries oc-
cur. Thus, the ALI Principles provide for a centrali-
sed jurisdiction in favour of the courts at the place 
of action, independent of the means utilised to per-
petrate the infringement, and therefore not only in 
cases of “ubiquitous infringements”, (this wording 
is not adopted by the ALI Principles). This solution 
allows for consolidation of jurisdiction at the place 
from which the infringement in its entirety has star-
ted, such as in the country where the infringing con-
tent was first published or uploaded or where the in-
fringing goods were fabricated.
43 The Japanese Transparency Proposal establishes in 
Article 105 that Japanese courts shall have jurisdic-
tion over an infringement claim if the infringing act 
took place or is likely to take place in Japan. The ex-
tent of jurisdiction of the court at the place where 
the infringing act took place or is to take place is es-
tablished by the first part of Article 105, which sta-
tes that infringement jurisdiction should only ex-
tend to the territory of the State which has grounds 
for infringement jurisdiction. However, the Japa-
nese Transparency Proposal poses an exception to 
the general rule, which can be recalled as an “escape 
clause”, because under the second part of Article 
105, Japanese courts shall decline jurisdiction in ca-
ses of “ubiquitous infringement” claims. Therefore 
the defendant can escape the Japanese jurisdiction. 
44 The Joint Korean and Japanese Proposal poses the 
principle that infringement jurisdiction shall vest 
in the courts in all countries where the alleged in-
fringement occurs, stating that “A person may be 
sued in the courts of any state where the alleged in-
fringement occurs” (Article 203 (the 1st sentence of 
paragraph (1)).  The so-called “[S]tate in which the 
major part of his or her activities that initiate infrin-
gement” (it is worth noting here that this second 
sentence in Article 203(1) is missing the word “oc-
cur” at the end) means not only the State in which 
those allegedly infringing activities were initiated, 
but also the State in which the injuries arising out 
of those activities occur. The Joint Korean and Ja-
panese Proposal limits the scope of jurisdiction of 
the courts of the State where the activities occur-
red to the injuries occurring in that State, as this is 
the country to which the activities of the defendant 
were “directed” (under Article 203(2)). However, Ar-
ticle 203 (the 2nd sentence of paragraph (1)) poses an 
escape clause according to which when the injuries 
occur in multiple States, regardless of the sequence 
of those injuries, the person whose infringement ac-
tivities give rise to those injuries may be sued in the 
courts of the State in which the major part of his 
or her activities that initiated the alleged infringe-
ment occurred.  So, if the defendant did not perpe-
trate the major part of his/her activities in the fo-
rum state, then he/she cannot be sued there. Finally, 
the Comments to Article 203 (specifically, to the 2nd 
sentence of paragraph (1)) clarify that the “state in 
which the major part of his or her activities … [oc-
cur]” means the State in which the essential and sub-
stantial part of those activities occur.  International 
jurisdiction with regard to infringements occurring 
in multiple states is then granted to the courts in the 
country where the “major part” of the activities in-
itiating the infringement took place. This court can 
deal with all the claims arising out of that infringe-
ment irrespective of the fact that they are located 
outside the forum state. 
45 The 2001 Draft of the Hague Judgment Convention 
seems to support the limited approach taken by the 
Transparency Proposal and the Joint Korean and Ja-
panese Proposal. Article 10(1)(a) states that a plain-
tiff may bring an action “in the courts of the State 
– in which the act or omission that caused the in-
jury occurred.” This is then limited by the require-
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ment in (2); namely that the “activity” complained 
of must have been directed to that State by the de-
fendant, or have been engaged in by the defendant 
frequently or significantly in that State, and that 
the claim arises out of that activity, and the overall 
connection of the defendant to that particular State 
means it is reasonable for the defendant to be sued 
in that State. Furthermore, Article 10(3) provides an 
escape rule, in that the defendant cannot be sued in 
the place of action “where the defendant has taken 
reasonable steps to avoid acting in or directing ac-
tivity into that State.”
46 With respect to the court at the place of the re-sult, the ALI Principles, the Transparency Propo-sal, and the Joint Korean and Japanese Proposal establish jurisdiction at the place of the result of the infringement, but provide for a territorially li-mited scope of the corresponding courts’ autho-rity. In addition, these sets of Principles provide escape clauses, allowing the court at the place of the result to dismiss the case when the activities are not directed to the forum state (ALI Princip-les), in cases of ubiquitous infringements (Trans-parency Proposal), and in relation to multistate infringements (Joint Korean and Japanese Propo-sal). Howeverthe court at the place of the result shall 
not dismiss the case and therefore shall exercise juris-
diction without any territorial limitation on all of the 
infringement claims (centralized jurisdiction) in the 
case of ubiquitous infringements, whenever the re-
sults are maximised or are to be maximised in Japan, 
under the Transparency Proposal; andin the case of 
multistate infringements when the major part of the 
activities that initiated the alleged infringement oc-
curred in the forum state, under the Joint Korean and 
Japanese Proposal.
47 To be more precise, the ALI Principles state that the 
plaintiff may also sue before the court of any State 
in which the defendant’s activities give rise to an in-
fringement claim. The extent of the jurisdiction of 
the court of the state where the infringement oc-
curred is limited to injuries suffered in that forum 
state. As for the escape clause of the ALI Principles, 
according to the second sentence of Section 204(2), 
the jurisdiction of the courts at the place of infrin-
gement can be denied if the defendant did not direct 
his/her activities to that state.44 
48 The Japanese Transparency Proposal establishes in 
Article 105 that Japanese courts shall have jurisdic-
tion over infringement if the results of an IPR infrin-
gement occurred or are to occur in Japan. The ex-
tent of jurisdiction of the court at the place where 
the results of the infringement occurred or are to 
occur is established by the first part of Article 105, 
which sets forth the general principle that infringe-
ment jurisdiction should only extend to the territory 
of the State where the ground for attributing such 
jurisdiction exists. However, the Japanese Transpa-
rency Proposal also poses an escape clause. Hence, 
according to the second part of Article 105, Japanese 
courts shall decline jurisdiction over “ubiquitous in-
fringement” claims. However, there is an exception 
to the escape clause, thus allowing the court seized 
to exercise jurisdiction whenever the results of the 
ubiquitous infringements are maximised or are to be 
maximised in Japan. In this case the court can exer-
cise jurisdiction over the entire infringement, re-
gardless of where the injuries occur. Thus, if the in-
fringements at stake are perpetrated throughout an 
ubiquitous medium (e.g., the Internet) and the State 
of the forum is also the state where the results of 
the infringement are maximized, Article 105 confers 
centralized jurisdiction on the courts of the forum 
State to adjudicate the entire infringement claims 
wherever the injuries occur. 
49 The Joint Korean and Japanese Proposal establishes 
the principle that infringement jurisdiction shall be 
vested in the courts in all countries where an infrin-
gement occurs, stating that “A person may be sued 
in the courts of any state where the alleged infrin-
gement occurs” (the 1st sentence of paragraph (1)). 
The so-called “[S]tate in which the major part of his 
or her activities to initiate an alleged infringement 
[occur]” means not only the State in which those ac-
tivities that initiate the alleged infringement occur 
but also the State in which the injuries arising out 
of those activities occur. This is made clear by the 
Comments to the Joint Korean and Japanese Propo-
sal, which first reintroduce the category of activities, 
not present in the text of the Proposal, and charac-
terize this category as encompassing both activities 
and results. The Joint Korean and Japanese Proposal 
limits the extent of jurisdiction of the courts of the 
State in which the injuries arising out of those acti-
vities occur to the injuries occurring in that State, 
as this is where the activities of the defendant were 
“directed”. However, Article 203 (the 2nd sentence of 
paragraph (1)) poses an escape clause.  According to 
this Article, when the injuries occur in multiple sta-
tes, the person whose infringement activities give 
rise to those injuries may be sued in the courts of 
the State in which the major part of his or her ac-
tivities that initiated the alleged infringement oc-
curred, regardless of the sequence of those injuries. 
Thus, an injury suffered in a State is not sufficient for 
jurisdiction; only a State where the defendant per-
petrated a major part of his or her allegedly infrin-
ging activities will have jurisdiction under this Ar-
ticle (see supra B.IV.1). 
50 The 2001 Draft to the Hague Judgment Convention 
takes a similar approach to the other three sets of 
Principles discussed. Article 10(1)(b) makes it clear 
that the plaintiff can bring a claim in the State in 
which the injury arose. However the same section 
poses an escape clause, in that if the defendant es-
tablishes that the person purported to be respon-
sible could not reasonably foresee that the act or 
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omission could result in an injury in that State, the 
plaintiff will not be able to bring their action there.
51 Article 10(5) establishes the extent of the jurisdic-
tion of courts in the State where the result has oc-
curred. It states that those courts will have juris-
diction “only in respect of the injury that occurred 
or may occur in that State, unless the injured per-
son has his or her habitual residence in that State.”
52 The jurisdiction at the place of the infringement me-
ans the jurisdiction at the place of both the infrin-
gement activity and the infringement results under 
the CLIP Principles. This is due to the notion that ac-
tivity and results cannot be split up due to the terri-
torial nature of IPRs. Yet, Article 2:202 requires that 
the infringing conduct that can base the infringe-
ment jurisdiction occurs in a certain State, and is di-
rected to that certain State.45 
53 In addition, the CLIP Principles establish a terri-
torially limited scope of the court’s authority un-
der 2:203(1) i.e., the court can only adjudicate on 
the infringements that occurred inside its State. Al-
though there is a territorial limitation of the jurisdic-
tion to the place of the infringement under the CLIP 
Principles, it was considered necessary to allow the 
court at the place of the infringement to have cen-
tralized jurisdiction over the entire infringement, 
with no territorial confinement, in one exceptio-
nal case:, whenthe infringement is perpetrated th-
rough ubiquitous media. Ubiquitous infringement 
“means concurrent multi-territorial infringements 
evoked by a single act of operation”46 – with the 
main example of ubiquitous media being the Inter-
net. In these cases, the CLIP Principles provide that 
the court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to 
the entire infringement, namely the infringement 
that occurs or may occur within the territory of the 
forum State as well as in any other States, when a 
number of qualifications are met (set out under Ar-
ticle 2:203(2)). First, the allegedly infringing activity 
must be carried out through ubiquitous media. Se-
cond, such activity must have no substantial effect 
in the State or States where the alleged infringer is 
habitually resident. Third, even if an alternative fo-
rum can be established in principle, the venue cho-
sen by the plaintiff must conform to a positive re-
quirement in order to ensure that it is not chosen 
arbitrarily. Namely, it must be established that eit-
her substantial activities in furtherance of the in-
fringement have been carried out in the forum State, 
or that the harm occurring in that State is substan-
tial in relation to the infringement in its entirety.47 
54 In contrast, as outlined above, the court at the place 
of the infringement does not have jurisdiction at all 
when the defendant did not act in the forum state in 
furtherance or initiation of the infringement, and if 
the activities causing the infringement cannot rea-
sonably be seen as having been directed to that State 
(under Article 2:202). This clause is also called an 
escape clause because it allows the defendant the 
possibility of escaping the infringement court’s ju-
risdiction.48 The elements in the escape clause are 
meant to apply cumulatively, signified by the use 
of “and”. If one is lacking, infringement jurisdiction 
will still be found. 
55 With respect to the escape clauses, the Japanese 
Transparency Proposal applies its escape clause in 
a stricter way than the ALI Principles, the CLIP Prin-
ciples and the Joint Korean and Japanese Proposal. 
Thus, the Japanese Transparency Proposal allows 
for a broader exercise of jurisdiction by forum State 
courts, allowing Japanese courts to exercise juris-
diction when the result of the infringement is ma-
ximised in Japan. Indeed, the category of “results of 
the infringement” is very broad and poses problems 
with respect to its characterisation. Moreover, the 
Japanese Transparency Proposal does not pose any 
further conditions other than the results being ma-
ximised in Japan, such as the activities being direc-
ted to Japan or the defendant acting in Japan. 
56 In contrast, these conditions are posed by the other 
sets of Principles. Hence, the CLIP Principles allow 
for the exercise of jurisdiction by forum State courts 
only if the alleged infringement occurred or will oc-
cur in that State, and the defendant either acted in 
the forum state to initiate or further the infringe-
ment or directed his/her activity to the same state, 
or both. 
57 The ALI Principles allow the forum state court to 
exercise jurisdiction only when the defendant di-
rected his/her activities to the forum state, indepen-
dently of his/her acting also in that state. 
58 The Joint Korean and Japanese Proposal conditions 
the exercise of jurisdiction to the case of multistate 
infringements where the major part of the defen-
dant’s activities that initiate the alleged multistate 
infringement occurred in the forum state (accor-
ding to the Comments to the Joint Korean and Ja-
panese Proposal, this means the state in which the 
essential and substantial part of those activities oc-
cur). So, while the notions of activity directed to or 
defendant acting in the forum state can be assessed 
by taking into account all of the relevant circum-
stances, including the language, content, and other 
aspects from which the territorial scope of the tar-
geted area may be inferred, it is not clear what kind 
of assessments characterise the notion of “results 
maximised in Japan”, and it seems it would be pos-
sible to ascertain jurisdiction under this requirement 
where the merely economic results of the infringe-
ment are suffered in Japan.
59 However, the Japanese Proposal only allows for the 
application of the escape clause to cases when the al-
legedly infringing activity is spread through ubiqui-
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tous media. In contrast, the Joint Korean and Japa-
nese Proposal allows for the application of the escape 
clause to multistate infringements cases that are not 
necessarily perpetrated throughout the Internet or 
another form of ubiquitous media. Also, the CLIP 
Principles and the ALI Principles do not condition 
the application of their escape clauses to the nature 
of the means through which the infringement is per-
petrated, or to the number of countries involved in 
the infringement.
60 The 2001 Draft of the Hague Judgment Convention is 
similar to the CLIP Principles in that its escape clause 
is based on the activities of the defendant, rather 
than on the type of media involved or whether the 
infringement is multistate. This is discussed below 
in paragraph B.IV.4.
61 With particular regard to centralised jurisdiction, 
the following can be said. The ALI Principles, the 
CLIP Principles, the Transparency Proposal and the 
Joint Korean and Japanese Proposal allow for the ad-
judication of the infringement in its entirety in cer-
tain circumstances.  Under the CLIP Principles, it is 
only when the infringements are committed through 
a form of ubiquitous media, whereas the ALI Prin-
ciples, the Joint Korean and Japanese Proposal, and 
the Japanese Transparency Proposal also allow for 
the consolidation of claims with respect to infringe-
ments carried out in other ways. In contrast to the 
CLIP Principles, the Transparency Proposal impedes 
the centralization of jurisdiction with respect to in-
fringements carried out throughout ubiquitous me-
dia, save when the results are maximized in Japan. 
62 In this respect the CLIP Principles are much stricter 
than the other Principles and Proposals in allowing 
centralized jurisdiction. In fact, while the Transpa-
rency Proposal has a similar rule with respect to ubi-
quitous infringement, the CLIP Principle’s rule is still 
stricter.  Hence, the relevant Transparency Proposal 
rule operates independently from the fact that the 
activities allegedly causing the infringement have 
substantial effect in the State or States where the 
alleged infringer is habitually resident, whereas the 
CLIP Principles rule requires that the activities alle-
gedly causing the ubiquitous infringement have no 
substantial effect in the State or States where the al-
leged infringer is habitually resident. However, the 
CLIP Principles, like the Transparency Proposal, al-
low for centralized jurisdiction over infringement 
claims before the forum state courts even though 
not all of the activities in furtherance of the infrin-
gement have been carried out within the territory 
of the forum state, when the harm caused by the in-
fringement in the forum state is substantial (CLIP 
Principles) and when the results of an “ubiquitous 
infringement” are maximized or are to be maximi-
zed in Japan (Transparency), respectively.
63 Furthermore, the CLIP Principles establish certain 
requirements that must be met before extending 
the scope of the jurisdiction to the entire infrin-
gement (set out under Article 2:203(2)(a) and (b)). 
These requirements are much stricter than the ones 
posed by the corresponding rules of the ALI Princi-
ples, the Joint Korean and Japanese Proposal49 and 
the Transparency Proposal with regard to infringe-
ments spread through non-ubiquitous forms of me-
dia (these are outlined below).  However, the Trans-
parency Proposal does have a rule on infringements 
carried out through ubiquitous media that seems 
to pose requirements similar to the CLIP Principles’ 
corresponding provisions, namely that the results 
of the “ubiquitous infringement” are to be maximi-
zed in Japan.
64 Specifically, the CLIP Principles require that the ac-
tivities allegedly causing the ubiquitous infringe-
ment have no substantial effect in the State or Sta-
tes where the alleged infringer is habitually resident, 
and that the activities in furtherance of the infrin-
gement in its entirety have been carried out within 
the territory of the forum state or the harm caused 
by the infringement in the forum state is substan-
tial. In contrast, the ALI Principles establish that the 
court situated in the place where the defendant has 
substantially acted, or taken substantial prepara-
tory acts, to initiate or further an alleged infringe-
ment has jurisdiction extending to claims respecting 
all injuries arising out of the conduct, wherever the 
injuries occur. This result is the same with regard to 
the corresponding Transparency Proposal rule rela-
ted to infringements carried out through non-ubi-
quitous forms of media  (it must be that the infrin-
ging act took place or is to take place in Japan), and 
with regard to the Joint Korean and Japanese Propo-
sal’s corresponding provision on multistate infrin-
gements (the forum state must be the state in which 
the major part of the activities occur). 
65 Finally, the ALI Principles also provide for an al-
ternative forum when a person cannot be sued in a 
Member State of the WTO with respect to the full ter-
ritorial scope of the infringement. In this case, Sec-
tion 204(3) of the ALI Principles provides that a per-
son may be sued before the courts of any State where 
his/her activities give rise to infringement claims, if 
the activities were directed to that State, or where 
the person solicits or maintains regular business 
contacts, whether or not that activity is connected 
with the infringement. The provision only applies 
in the rather rare case that a person is habitually 
resident in a non-WTO State. Such a person would 
then be amenable to court, without territorial res-
trictions, in any country to which his or her activi-
ties are directed, or with which substantial contacts 
of any kind are maintained. The extent of jurisdic-
tion of the court seized on the basis of Section 204.3 
concerns the entire infringement and thus covers 
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all injuries that relate to the alleged infringement in 
the State, regardless of where the injuries occurred. 
66 The 2001 Draft of the Hague Judgment Convention 
also seems to allow the adjudication of the entire 
infringement in one centralised jurisdiction in cer-
tain cases, as is discussed below in paragraph B.IV.4. 
2. Rationale 
67  With regard to the jurisdiction at the place of the ac-
tion, the ALI Principles, the Transparency Proposal 
and the Joint Korean and Japanese Proposal grant 
Jurisdiction at the place of the action. The extent of 
this jurisdiction, however, varies among those sets 
of Principles.  
68  The ALI Principles establish that a court situated in 
the place where the defendant has substantially ac-
ted, or taken substantial preparatory acts, to initiate 
or to further an alleged infringement has jurisdic-
tion and its jurisdiction extends to claims respec-
ting all injuries arising out of the conduct, wherever 
the injuries occur. Thus, the ALI Principles provide 
for a centralised jurisdiction in favour of the courts 
at the place of action independent from the means 
utilised to perpetrate the infringement. According 
to the Comments to this rule “examples of substan-
tial activity, in addition to those discussed in Com-
ment a, include maintaining a manufacturing or dis-
tribution center for patent-infringing components, 
or a factory that silkscreens infringing trademarks 
onto T-shirts.”50 This solution allows consolidation 
of judgments at the place from which the infringe-
ment in its entirety has emanated, such as in the 
country where the infringing goods were fabrica-
ted, or where the infringing content was first pub-
lished. The provision may also be said to implement 
the approach of the ECJ Shevill decision.51
69 The Japanese Transparency Proposal establishes 
in Article 105 that Japanese courts shall have juris-
diction over infringement if the infringing act took 
place or is to take place in Japan. This rule adopts the 
same notion of “infringing act” as has been adopted 
by the new Japanese Act on International Jurisdic-
tion. This Act establishes that an action related to a 
tort may be filed in the courts of Japan when “the 
tort occurred in Japan (except where the result of a 
harmful act committed abroad has occurred in Ja-
pan and the occurrence of that result in Japan would 
have been normally unforeseeable).”52 According to 
the Annotation which accompanies this Act, “in the 
cases where the place of a harmful act and the place 
of the result of the act differ, it is sufficient if eit-
her the act or the result took place in Japan except 
in the case mentioned in the bracket” (i.e., except 
where the harm would have normally been unfore-
seeable).53 This rule is applicable to IPRs, because of 
the absence of a specific provision on these torts and 
the exclusion of IPRs infringements from the scope 
of exclusive jurisdiction rule.54 Article 105 also esta-
blishes the scope of jurisdiction granted to the court 
at the place where the infringing act took place or is 
to take place, by adopting the general principle that 
infringement jurisdiction should only extend to the 
territory of the State where the ground for attribu-
ting such jurisdiction exists. 
70 The Japanese Transparency Proposal also poses 
both a general escape clause and an exception to 
the escape clause, as discussed above. In this case, 
the court has jurisdiction to adjudicate the entire in-
fringement, wherever the injuries occur. The excep-
tional character of the escape clause in Article 105 of 
the Transparency Proposal is marked by the gram-
matical structure of the provision. It follows from 
the wording (“except the case where …”) that the 
burden for establishing that the jurisdiction does not 
exist lies with the defendant contesting jurisdiction.
71 This rule partially reflects Japanese law. The new 
Japanese Act on International Jurisdiction establis-
hes that an action related to a tort may be filed with 
the courts of Japan when “the tort occurred in Japan 
(except where the result of a harmful act committed 
abroad has occurred in Japan and the occurrence of 
that result in Japan would have been normally un-
foreseeable)”.55 The rule offers a valid basis to deny 
the jurisdiction of the Japanese courts in cases where 
the contacts between the forum and the tortfeasor 
are very weak, including cases where the infringing 
content is merely accessible from Japan, but has not 
been directed there and does not have a substantial 
effect on the market.56 Similarly, the Transparency 
Proposal uses the escape clause to deny internatio-
nal jurisdiction to the courts in Japan in cases where 
the infringement is spread through ubiquitous me-
dia, except in cases where the results of the ubiqui-
tous infringement are maximised in Japan.  This re-
flects the approach adopted by the Japanese Act on 
International Jurisdiction, since in most cases of ubi-
quitous infringement, it is highly probable that the 
occurrence of the harmful effect in Japan was unfo-
reseeable. Additionally, while the exception to the 
escape clause is grounded without any reference to 
the foreseeability requirement, in the case that the 
results were maximised or are to be maximised in 
Japan, that result would be “usually foreseeable.”57 
Furthermore, the Japanese Transparency Proposal 
rule denies jurisdiction only where the results of the 
harmful effects that are unforeseeable are spread th-
rough ubiquitous media, whereas the new Japanese 
Act on International Jurisdiction denies the Japanese 
jurisdiction independently from the way in which 
the tort was committed. Finally, the Transparency 
Proposal conditions the exercise of jurisdiction in its 
entirety over ubiquitous infringement claims by Ja-
panese courts to the fact that the results of the in-
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fringement are maximised in Japan without adopting 
the connecting factor of infringing activities. This is 
because “in the era of cloud computing, a server as 
the central point of infringement is no longer iden-
tifiable. It means that identifying an infringing “act” 
does not make much sense, and the factor of an act 
is losing its significance as [a] jurisdictional ground 
in the context of [the] Internet.”58 Another Japanese 
scholar has stated similarly that “[a]fter all, it seems 
appropriate to accept the assertion that, in regards 
to IP infringement on the Internet, identifying an 
infringing “act” does not make much sense, and the 
factor of an “act” is losing its significance as a juris-
dictional ground.  Therefore, the place of the result 
should be the jurisdictional ground in the context 
of the Internet.”59
72 In a recent case concerning the infringement of pa-
tents on the Internet, the IP High Court in Japan ad-
dressed whether the principle of territoriality has 
anything to do with international jurisdiction.  The 
plaintiff, a Japanese company, sought an injunction 
and damages against a Korean company, whose web-
site contained information about products allegedly 
infringing the plaintiff’s patents.  The plaintiff ar-
gued that the website constitutes an “offering for as-
signment,” which constituted an infringement of the 
plaintiff’s Japanese patents.  The Court first decla-
red “that it is appropriate to determine a Japanese 
courts’ international jurisdiction over the case ac-
cording to whether the transmitting act of the of-
fering or the reception of the offering as the result 
occurred in Japan or not.”60  The Court went on to 
analyze the specific circumstances of the case with 
respect to the website, such as the introduction of 
the allegedly infringing product, providing the ad-
dresses and telephone number of the defendant’s 
sales headquarters in Japan, and the possibility of 
sales inquiries for similar products through the de-
fendant’s webpage.61  However, after analyzing these 
specific circumstances, the Court affirmed its inter-
national jurisdiction without making clear whether 
the infringing act or the result arising out if it had 
occurred in Japan.62 
73 The Joint Korean and Japanese Proposal poses the 
principle that infringement jurisdiction shall be ves-
ted in the courts in all countries where an infringe-
ment occurs, stating that “[a] person may be sued in 
any state in which infringement activities occur (the 
1st sentence of paragraph (1), Article 203).  However, 
the Comments to the Proposal make clear that “the 
so-called “state in which the major part of his or her 
activities that initiate the alleged infringement [oc-
cur]” means not only the state in which those activi-
ties to initiate that infringement occur but also the 
state in which the injuries arising out of those ac-
tivities occur”. The Comments then go further and 
maintain at footnote 9 that “[t]he same provision” 
on jurisdiction with respect to infringement s also 
found in the Transparency Proposal (Article 105). 
However, an infringement of intellectual property 
rights differs from a traditional tort. Any conduct 
infringing the absolute intellectual property right is 
enough to constitute an infringement. In summary, 
it seems that the Joint Korean and Japanese Propo-
sal grants jurisdiction to the court of the State where 
the activity to initiate an infringement occurred, 
even though the Comments suggest taking the ter-
ritoriality principle into account. The Joint Korean 
and Japanese Proposal limits the extent of jurisdic-
tion of the courts of the State where the activities oc-
curred to the injuries occurring in that State, as that 
State is where the activities of the defendant were 
“directed”. In this regard, the Comments to this rule 
recall the ECJ Shevill jurisprudence63 and emphasize 
that jurisdiction should be limited to those claims 
respecting the injuries occurring within that state. 
74 However, Article 203 (the 2nd sentence of paragraph 
(1)) poses an escape clause which posits that when 
the injuries from an infringement occur in multiple 
states, the person whose infringement activities give 
rise to those injuries may be sued in the courts of 
the State where the major part of his or her activi-
ties initiating the alleged infringement were taken, 
regardless of the sequence of those injuries. Thus, 
if the defendant did not perpetrate the major part 
of his/her activities in the forum state then he/she 
cannot be sued there. Yet, according to the Com-
ments to Article 203 (the 2nd sentence of paragraph 
(1)) the “state in which the major part of those ac-
tivities occur” means the “state in which the essen-
tial and substantial part of those activities occur.” 
In respect to international jurisdiction with regard 
to infringements occurring in multiple states, the 
Joint Korean and Japanese Proposal grants jurisdic-
tion to the courts in the country where the “major 
part” of the activities initiating the infringement 
took place, without any relevance given to the me-
dia through which the infringement is perpetrated. 
This court can deal with all the claims arising out 
of that infringement irrespective of their location 
outside the forum state. However, the same Com-
ments to this Article maintain that “there is much 
difficulty in definitely specifying the circumstances 
under which this Article applies and it may be un-
duly applied” grounding an unduly centralized ju-
risdiction. Thus, the Comments refer to Article 211 
which requires some special considerations to be ta-
ken into account by the court which has internatio-
nal jurisdiction in deciding whether to exercise that 
jurisdiction (“the court when it finds that there are 
special circumstances that will be harmful to fair-
ness between the parties and prevent due process 
or prompt trial, considering the nature of the ac-
tion, convenience for the defendant to enter an ap-
pearance, domiciles of the parties and witnesses to 
be examined, the location of material evidence to be 
collected and any other circumstances, may dismiss 
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an action partly or wholly”). Furthermore, the Com-
ments to Article 203 maintain that it is necessary to 
“prevent the excessive application of this Article”. 
75 The 2001 Draft of the Hague Judgment Convention 
also allows for centralization of jurisdiction at the 
place of the action, as is discussed below in para-
graph B.IV.4.
76 With respect to the jurisdiction at the place of the 
infringement/results, in all the Proposals the extent 
of jurisdiction at the place of the infringement/re-
sults is restricted to infringements that occurred in 
that country, following the “mosaic approach”. Ho-
wever, under certain conditions, consolidation of 
claims is allowed. 
77 The ALI Principles state that the plaintiff might uti-
lise the court of any State in which the defendant’s 
activities give rise to an infringement claim. The 
extent of the jurisdiction of the court of the State 
where the infringement occurred is limited to acti-
vities occurring in that forum state. This provision 
is consistent with the approach taken in the ECJ She-
vill Case.64 
78 Yet, the ALI Principles pose an escape clause: the se-
cond sentence of Section 204(2) provides that the ju-
risdiction of the courts at the place of infringement 
can be denied if the defendant did not direct65 his or 
her activities to that state. This reflects the desire to 
avoid granting jurisdiction in cases of infringement 
that occurred accidentally. Furthermore, in those 
cases the infringements generally have minimal ef-
fects (see above). The notion of “directing activities” 
was adopted so as to express a standard which is less 
strict than “targeting”, while retaining an element 
of intentionality.66 The escape clause is drafted for 
application in all types of cases. Yet, it is reasonable 
to assume that it will be applied especially in Inter-
net cases. This assumption derives from i.a. the ALI 
Principles’ Reporters Notes that concentrate on In-
ternet cases.67 The escape clause allows, then, for 
restriction of jurisdiction in certain cases of “over-
spill”. Such restrictions may be called for when a po-
tential infringer has limited or no control over the 
territorial impact of the allegedly harmful action, 
because the effects of the initiating act are “disper-
sed” over different territories. Most typically, this 
occurs when infringing content is distributed th-
rough mass media. All of the circumstances of a gi-
ven case must be taken into account when asses-
sing whether activities were “directed” to the forum 
State.  For example, if the infringing material is dis-
persed through a website, a court should consider 
factors such as the languages used on the site; types 
of currency accepted; references to localities; and, 
when appropriate, disclaimers.68 
79 The Japanese Transparency Proposal establishes in 
Article 105 that Japanese courts shall have jurisdic-
tion over infringement if the results of an IPR in-
fringement occurred or are to occur in Japan. This 
rule adopts the notion of results of the infringement 
which is also proper under the new Japanese Act on 
International Jurisdiction, as already mentioned.69 
The results criterion is particularly important for the 
Transparency Proposal as will be highlighted when 
the ubiquitous infringements centralised jurisdic-
tion of this Proposal will be addressed.70 
80 The 2001 Draft of the Hague Judgment Convention 
also allows for consolidation of claims in the place 
of the result under one condition, which is discus-
sed below in paragraph B.IV.4.
81 According to Article 2:202 of the CLIP Principles, in 
disputes concerned with infringement of an IPR, a 
person may be sued in the courts of the State where 
the alleged infringement occurs or may occur. As 
previously mentioned, the Comments make clear 
that the notion of infringement adopted by this pro-
posal is comprehensive of both activity and results 
and cannot be split up due to the territorial nature 
of IPRs. 
82 Paragraph 1 of Article 2:203 sets forth the general 
principle that infringement jurisdiction should only 
extend to the territory of the State where the ground 
for attributing such jurisdiction exists, i.e. the State 
where the infringement occurred or may occur. Al-
though this Article establishes a general jurisdiction 
rule that is territorially restrictive, the drafters did 
consider it necessary to allow for centralized juris-
diction in one specific case, namely when the infrin-
gements are perpetrated through ubiquitous media. 
In these cases, paragraph 2 of Article 2:203 establis-
hes an alternative forum in favour of the court that 
has jurisdiction according to Article 2:202. This court 
shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to the entire 
infringement, namely the infringement that occurs 
or may occur within the territory of the forum State 
as well as within any other States, provided that a 
number of qualifications are met. First, the infrin-
ging activity must be carried out through an ubiqui-
tous medium. Second, the allegedly infringing acti-
vity must have no substantial effect in the State or 
States where the alleged infringer is habitually re-
sident. This clause is intended to protect against ab-
use of the system: if the alleged infringer does not 
direct her/his business to the market in the State 
where she/he has taken residence, there is no de-
monstrable reason for choosing that location to re-
side in other than to evade an efficient pursuit of 
justice. Third, even if an alternative forum can be 
established in principle, the venue chosen by the 
plaintiff must conform to a positive requirement in 
order to ensure that it is not chosen arbitrarily: it 
must be established that either substantial activities 
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in furtherance of the infringement have been car-
ried out in the forum State, or that the harm accru-
ing in that State is substantial in relation to the in-
fringement in its entirety. The rationale of the CLIP 
Principles ubiquitous infringement rule is that when 
the infringement is committed through ubiquitous 
media, such as the Internet, the risk for wide-spread 
infringement is extremely high and the ability to ef-
fectively and efficiently enforce one’s claims may 
be seriously hampered.71  For example, the infrin-
ger may not have any production sites or a sizeable 
business establishment of some permanence, where 
his habitual residence can be located. The problem is 
further enhanced by the fact that whatever is nee-
ded for carrying out the infringement – in particular 
the location of the server – can be swiftly moved, and 
can be set up without much difficulty in states which 
either do not provide an adequate level of legal pro-
tection, or where the law remains on paper only and 
is not enforced in practice (“information havens”).72 
In such cases of abusive conduct, when the alleged in-
fringer seeks to evade an efficient pursuit of justice, 
the plaintiff would be unfairly disadvantaged if the 
possibility were denied to establish infringement ju-
risdiction extending over national borders in an al-
ternative forum, independent of the state of the de-
fendant’s habitual residence. 
83 As for the escape clause of the CLIP Principles, which 
is provided for in the second part Article 2:202, as al-
ready recalled, an activity cannot ground infringe-
ment jurisdiction “unless the alleged infringer has 
not acted in that State to initiate or further the in-
fringement and his/her activity cannot reasonably 
be seen as having been directed to that State”. In 
other words if the defendant can demonstrate that 
he/she did not act or direct his/her activities to the 
forum state, the courts of this state shall decline ju-
risdiction even though these activities are located 
in the country that granted the right and therefore 
should be considered as the forum delicti. As already 
seen the requirements of the acting in that State and 
directing the activity in that same State are meant 
to implement the “directed to” test and the “com-
mercial effects” qualification.73 Yet, the new ver-
sion of the CLIP Principles modified the wording of 
the rule, dropping the requirement of substantiality 
which was posed by the previous version of the rule 
and shifting the burden of proof to challenge infrin-
gement jurisdiction to the alleged infringer. These 
variations were made in response to criticisms ad-
dressed to the previous version of the correspondent 
rule. Those criticisms highlighted that if infringe-
ment jurisdiction could only be established by pro-
ving substantial activities or substantial harm wit-
hin the territory of the forum state this could have 
been too burdensome for the claimant, usually the 
IPR owner.  In fact, IPRs owners generally only find 
a single infringing item on the relevant market, and 
as a consequence seize the court of the state of the 
market in question to obtain information and typi-
cally an injunction stopping further infringement. 
In those cases, therefore, it would be difficult for the 
IPR owner to demonstrate the substantial activity or 
harm in the relevant market, having as mentioned 
only single items as relevant proofs.74 
84 With particular regard to centralized jurisdiction 
the following can be said. All sets of Principles al-
low for centralized jurisdiction when certain requi-
rements are met. 
85 The CLIP Principles pose 4 requirements. First, cen-
tralized jurisdiction can be established only with re-
spect to Internet or other ubiquitous media cases. 
Second, the Principles require that the activities al-
legedly causing the ubiquitous infringement have 
no substantial effect in the State or States where the 
alleged infringer is habitually resident, since other-
wise the court would lack jurisdiction.75 Third, the 
activities in furtherance of the infringement have 
been carried out within the territory of the forum 
state in its entirety. Fourth, as an alternate require-
ment with respect to the third one, the harm cau-
sed by the infringement in the forum state is sub-
stantial. The fourth requirement was posed as an 
alternative requirement to the third one in a later 
version of the Principles. In fact, the rule in the pre-
vious version allowed centralized jurisdiction to be 
grounded only in cases “such as, e.g., a website pro-
vided by a natural person domiciled at Caribbean Is-
land who operates the services mainly from the US 
without being domiciled there. In this case the rule 
would grant unlimited jurisdiction in the US for in-
fringement claims.”76 Yet, this rule was considered 
to be too strict, and therefore the new version of the 
CLIP Principles and their final draft included the al-
ternative requirement number four just mentioned, 
to capture also other cases. So, for instance if the de-
fendant operates his website from its domicile in the 
Caribbean and targets US markets with his website 
US courts should have unlimited jurisdiction “if the 
highest share of the claimed damages or threatened 
damages relates to the infringement in the US irres-
pective of whether substantial activities have taken 
place in the US or not.”77
86 In contrast, the ALI Principles establish that where 
the court is situated in the place where the defen-
dant has substantially acted, or taken substantial 
preparatory acts, to initiate or to further an alle-
ged infringement, the court’s jurisdiction extends to 
claims respecting all injuries arising out of the con-
duct, wherever the injuries occur. 
87 Furthermore, the ALI Principles grant unlimited ju-
risdiction to certain courts in cases where the de-
fendant is resident in a non-WTO member State. The 
aim of this rule as adopted by the ALI Principles is to 
prevent a situation where a plaintiff’s claims cannot 
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efficiently be enforced in the defendant’s forum due 
to the fact that she/he “hides” in a State where le-
gal standards are low and pursuit of justice will be 
difficult. Using lack of WTO-membership as an ele-
ment to identify such non-amenable fora has the ad-
vantage of offering an objective and plausible crite-
rion for the distinction: if a State is bound to WTO/
TRIPS, it is presumed that its court system lives up 
to the standards prescribed in TRIPS with regard to 
substantive law as well as to the enforcement me-
chanisms available.
88 The centralized jurisdiction at the place of the ac-
tion irrespective of the means adopted to perpetrate 
the infringement is established by the Joint Korean 
and Japanese Proposal on multistate infringements, 
which is therefore in line with the ALI Principles 
corresponding rule. However, the Comments to the 
Joint Korean and Japanese Proposal relevant rule 
highlight that “there is much difficulty in definitely 
specifying the circumstances under which this Ar-
ticle [on centralized jurisdiction] applies and it may 
be unduly applied”, thereby unduly grounding cen-
tralized jurisdiction. Thus, it is necessary to “pre-
vent the excessive application of this Article”. The 
Comments refer to Article 211, which requires some 
special considerations to be taken into account by 
the court with international judicial jurisdiction in 
determining whether to exercise jurisdiction (“the 
court when it finds that there are special circum-
stances that will be harmful to fairness between the 
parties and prevent due process or prompt trial, con-
sidering the nature of the action, convenience for 
the defendant to enter an appearance, domiciles of 
the parties and witnesses to be examined, the loca-
tion of material evidence to be collected and any 
other circumstances, may dismiss an action partly 
or wholly”). 
89 The Transparency Proposal allows centralized juris-
diction in cases of ubiquitous infringements but only 
when the result of the infringement is localized in 
Japan. The reason for this rule is that “in the era of 
cloud computing, a server as the central point of in-
fringement is no longer identifiable. It means that 
identifying an infringing “act” does not make much 
sense, and the fact of an “act” is loosing its signifi-
cance as jurisdictional ground in the context of the 
Internet.”78 Yet the place of the occurrence of the re-
sult is further specified by the Transparency Propo-
sal. In fact, since this place can be largely expanded 
in a potentially unlimited number of states when the 
infringement occurs through the Internet the Trans-
parency Proposal focuses on the country where the 
results are to be maximized. According to the an-
notation to this rule “such a country is usually fo-
reseeable to persons who allegedly infringe or have 
infringed the intellectual property in question.”79 
This explains also the reason why the Transparency 
Proposal does not contain any exceptions to this rule 
that allows alleged infringers to escape jurisdiction 
in cases where the place of the result was unforesee-
able, like the relevant Japanese civil procedure na-
tional rule does.80 The place were the results are to 
be maximized should be determined by taking into 
account all relevant factors, such as the language 
of the website that typically indicates its targets (a 
website written exclusively in Japanese will target 
only Japanese consumers).81 
3. International Context
90 During the negotiations of the Hague Draft Conven-
tion on International Jurisdiction and Recognition 
of Foreign Judgments (hereafter Draft Convention), 
there was no consensus on whether to include IPRs 
infringement proceedings in the exclusive jurisdic-
tion rule, which would limit jurisdiction over infrin-
gement claims to the courts of the State that reco-
gnized or granted the IPR.82 In fact, assuming IPRs 
should have fallen within the scope of the Hague 
Convention, two alternative provisions were pro-
posed, of which Alternative A granted exclusive ju-
risdiction for pure infringement proceedings to the 
State of registration and Alternative B excluded IPRs 
infringement claims from the scope of the exclu-
sive jurisdiction rule. Despite the limited scope of 
the exclusive jurisdiction rules at least under Alter-
native B, the issue of exclusive jurisdiction was ex-
tensively debated during the Hague Draft Conven-
tion negotiations.83 During the special meeting of 
experts from different negotiating countries in Fe-
bruary 2001, many differences between the appro-
aches adopted in separate legal systems were exa-
mined. Particularly, the US delegation opposed the 
need for an exclusive jurisdiction rule in general, 
pointing out the “almost uniform opposition in the 
private sector to the current text as it applies to in-
tellectual property rights; and [the] great difficulty 
in understanding the structure of the draft conven-
tion text.”84 More specifically, “the US could not ac-
cept (in personam) jurisdiction in infringement on IP 
rights cases over a defendant who had no relation 
with the jurisdiction”,85 and also “raised questions 
about the need for exclusivity” highlighting that 
“some of the US private sector comments clearly op-
pose exclusive jurisdiction.”86 The delegations of UK, 
Australia and China supported the view that exclu-
sive jurisdiction should apply to the infringement 
of the patent. A number of other delegations, inclu-
ding Switzerland, Finland and Sweden, supported a 
more flexible view, according to which first, “inso-
far as patent [infringement] disputes [are] arbitrable, 
it seem[s] inconsistent to confer exclusive jurisdic-
tion for such disputes upon State courts”; second, 
“co-ordination between the proceedings on validity 
and on infringement could be ensured by other ways 
than by providing that the court of the place of re-
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gistration of the IP right has exclusive jurisdiction 
to hear all matters related to this right (validity is-
sues as well as infringement issues), for instance, 
by a suspension of proceedings by the court seized 
with the infringement claim, pending a decision on 
the validity by the court of the place of registration 
of the IP right.”87 However, the German and UK de-
legations pointed out that proceeding in this way 
could lead to a multiplication of litigation, especially 
when the patent at stake was a European patent and 
thus the national bundle of rights would require the 
parties to bring validity proceedings in each of the 
countries concerned.88  Finally, the Chair noted that 
there seemed to be no consensus on the question of 
whether infringement claims should be included in 
the scope of any exclusive jurisdiction rule. 
91 So, should infringement claims not come under the 
exclusive jurisdiction rule, their relevant jurisdic-
tion was to be found under The Hague Draft Juris-
diction in the rule applicable to all sorts of infringe-
ments, namely in Article 10 according to which “a 
plaintiff may bring an action in tort [or delict] in the 
courts of the State – (a) in which the act or omission 
that caused the injury occurred, or (b) in which the 
injury arose, unless the defendant establishes that 
the person claimed to be responsible could not rea-
sonably foresee that the act or omission could re-
sult in an injury of the same nature in that State.”89 
It is therefore apparent that the Hague Draft Con-
vention adopted the ubiquity theory for IPRs infrin-
gement claims, allowing the plaintiff to seize at the 
place of the action or at the place of the event, un-
der certain requirements and providing also for an 
escape clause.90
92 Finally, it is to be noted that the Hague Preliminary 
Draft Convention of 1999, in Article 10(4), granted 
unlimited jurisdiction to the court at the place of 
the plaintiff’s domicile, intended as a forum delicti. 
This approach was criticized as will be highlighted 
in paragraph B.V.4.   
93 With regard to pure infringement claims outside the 
scope of exclusive jurisdiction rules, notwithstan-
ding the fact that in the EU and EFTA legal systems 
there is no rule establishing exclusive jurisdiction 
rules for registered IPRs pure infringement issues, 
since the exclusive jurisdiction rules of the Brussels 
system do not cover those claims,91 certain EU/EFTA 
Member States adopted the view that pure infringe-
ment claims fall under the exclusive jurisdiction rule 
of Article 22(4) rather than under the infringement 
jurisdiction rule of Article 5(3) of the Brussels Sys-
tem.92 This approach was adopted in two Italian lo-
wer Courts’ decisions which extended the exclusive 
jurisdiction rules of the Brussels system to pure in-
fringement proceedings, maintaining that “even in 
the absence of a validity issue, a proceeding on the 
infringement as well as on the non-infringement of 
an IPR always requires, as an essential and implicit 
assumption, a preliminary evaluation of the scope of 
the patent. It follows, then, the exclusive jurisdiction 
ex Article 22(4) of the (EC) Regulation 44/2001 of the 
court of the State that granted the patent (or the por-
tion of the European patent).”93 The same approach 
was followed by the UK Court of Appeal in Lucasfilm, 
according to which Article 22(4) Brussels I Regula-
tion applies to copyright infringement proceedings 
and thereby precludes the application of Article 5(3) 
and Article 2 of the same Regulation.94 
94 Yet, the UK Court of Appeal’s Lucasfilm ruling was re-
versed by the Supreme Court’s 27 July 2011 ruling, 
which instead confirmed the Pearce judgment95 and 
maintained that Article 22(4) of the Brussels I Re-
gulation “only assigns exclusive jurisdiction to the 
country where the right originates in cases which 
are concerned with registration or validity of rights 
which are ‘required to be deposited or registered’ 
and does not apply to infringement actions in which 
there is no issue as to validity.”96 
95 With respect to positive infringement claims, many 
reasons militate against the few decisions that ex-
tend the exclusive jurisdiction rules of the Brussels 
system to pure infringement proceedings. Firstly, 
the literal interpretation of the exclusive jurisdic-
tion rules of the Brussels system emphasises that 
those rules do not refer to infringement claims and 
thus do not apply to them. Secondly, this result is 
confirmed by the Jenard Report to the Brussels Con-
vention, as well as by the Pocar Report to the Lu-
gano Convention, according to which infringement 
claims do not enter into the exclusive jurisdiction 
rules of the Brussels system.97 Thirdly, the same re-
sult is confirmed by a systematic interpretation of 
the EU Brussels I Regulation and the Rome II Regu-
lation,98 since Article 8 of the latter on “infringe-
ment of intellectual property rights”99 determines 
the possibility of applying a foreign law to IPRs in-
fringement claims, namely the lex loci protectionis, 
and as such “plainly envisages the litigation of for-
eign intellectual property rights” infringements.100 
Fourthly, it is widely acknowledged that the exten-
sion of exclusive jurisdiction rules to IPRs pure in-
fringement claims is “doubtless wrong.”101 Fifthly, 
this result is confirmed also under the CLIP Princi-
ples referring to the non-extension of the Brussels 
system exclusive jurisdiction rules to IPRs infringe-
ment claims.102 
96 In the EU frame, with regard to claims related to 
infringement actions or actions for declaration of 
non-infringement of the Community trademarks,103 
Articles 92–94 of the Community Trademark Regu-
lation pose “exclusive jurisdiction” rules.104  Howe-
ver, those norms do not ground the international ju-
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risdiction of a single exclusively competent court, 
but rather establish a plurality of equally competent 
tribunals, namely: the (trademark) courts of the EU 
Member State chosen by the parties according to 
the Brussels Convention (now Brussels I Regulation); 
the EU Member State where the defendant is domi-
ciled or has an establishment; the EU Member State 
where the plaintiff is domiciled or has an establish-
ment; the seat of the Office of Harmonization for the 
Internal Market (OHIM); or the State where the in-
fringement has been committed or threatened (with 
the exception of actions for a declaration of non-in-
fringement of a Community trade mark).105 Thus, as 
between the courts of EU Member States, the so-cal-
led “exclusive jurisdiction” rules established by the 
CTM Regulation are not actually exclusive at all.  Ho-
wever, Articles 92–94 of the Community Trademark 
Regulation do aim to limit jurisdiction to only the 
exclusively competent EU tribunals.  Thus, for those 
seeking to sue outside of the EU, these Articles do ef-
fectively establish exclusive jurisdiction rules, albeit 
in favor of more than one EU court. The conclusions 
just reached with respect to the Community trade-
marks also apply in relation to other European and 
Community IP rights, such as plant variety rights106 
and design.107
97 As for the national statutes and case law, since Ar-
ticle 22(4) of the Brussels system does not extend its 
exclusive jurisdiction rule to registered IPRs infrin-
gement claims, EU/EFTA Member States are not re-
quired by the Brussels Regulation to apply exclusive 
jurisdiction rules with respect to those claims. This 
conclusion is most recently reflected in the UK Su-
preme Court’s Lucasfilm judgment.  
98 EU/EFTA Member States do not generally include re-
gistered IPRs pure infringement claims under their 
exclusive jurisdiction rules even outside the Brus-
sels system.108 
99 Furthermore, the same result is achieved by other 
European continental countries that are not mem-
bers of the EU/EFTA. Thus, for example, Croatian 
courts would have jurisdiction over claims invol-
ving foreign registered IPRs pure infringement is-
sues, however raised.109 
100 As for the common law countries, including the UK, 
outside of the scope of the Brussels I Regulation the 
following can be said. In the UK, courts have gene-
rally refused to adjudicate foreign registered IPRs 
infringement claims. Yet, the ruling of the UK Sup-
reme Court in Lucasfilm, which adopted the opposite 
view with respect to copyright claims, can be rea-
sonably extended to registered IPRs infringement 
claims.110 Furthermore, even if exclusive jurisdic-
tion rules were still applicable with respect to those 
claims, their adoption should be limited to cases that 
do not fall under the Brussels system, in order for the 
exclusion of the exclusive jurisdiction rule rendered 
by this Regulation to prevail. 
101 In Australia, as already recalled, the Moçambique rule 
related to local land actions has been extended to 
actions for infringement of patents, excluding the 
jurisdiction of Australian Courts over foreign regis-
tered IPRs infringement claims.111 Yet, as already 
discussed,112 recent Australian case law has “ero-
ded the basis” for the Moçambique rule “to the point 
where it now seems possible that Australian courts 
could decide actions involving the infringement of 
foreign registered intellectual property rights.”113 At 
any rate, the Australian state of New South Wales has 
repealed the application of the Moçambique rule.114
102 Asian States, including China, Taiwan, Korea and Ja-
pan, do not establish any exclusive jurisdiction ru-
les with respect to registered IPRs pure infringement 
claims. In China, as already recalled, no exclusive 
jurisdiction rule is provided for with regard to IPRs 
claims in general, or specifically with regard to for-
eign registered IPRs disputes of any nature.115 Thus, 
in 2001, the Chinese Supreme Court published the 
“Interpretation of Several Rules on the Legal Issues 
arising from Patent Disputes Litigation”, which esta-
blished that “the plaintiff [in a patent infringement 
dispute] may sue at the place where the infringe-
ment occurs or where the defendant domiciles. The 
place of infringement includes: the place where the 
alleged patented invention utility model products 
are manufactured, used, offered for sale, sold, im-
ported; the place where the act of using patented 
process is committed, where the acts of using, pro-
mising to sell, selling, importing products that are 
directly obtained according to the patented process 
are committed; where the acts of manufacturing, 
selling, importing of patented designs products are 
committed. It includes also the place where the re-
sult of the above infringing activities occurred.”116 
103 In Japan, exclusive jurisdiction rules exist only with 
respect to principally raised validity issues of regis-
tered IPRs, but not with regard to pure infringement 
claims.117 This result was confirmed by the Tokyo 
District Court in the “Coral Sand judgment.”118
4. Discussion
104 With particular regard to the escape clauses the fol-
lowing can be said. While each of the proposals inclu-
des an escape clause to limit jurisdiction, the scope of 
these provisions and the circumstances under which 
they apply vary.
105 The escape clause of the Transparency Proposal is 
too lenient in allowing forum State courts to adju-
dicate cases. First the escape clause applies only to 
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ubiquitous infringements. Second, the escape clause 
does not apply, and courts can therefore exercise ju-
risdiction, when the results of the infringements are 
“maximized” in Japan, with no relevance being gi-
ven to whether the defendant is habitually resident 
in Japan or whether the defendant acted or directed 
his activities to Japan. It is not clear what kind of as-
sessments would characterise the notion of “results 
maximised in Japan” and it seems possible to ascer-
tain jurisdiction where the merely economic results 
of the infringement are suffered in Japan. Indeed, the 
notion of result of the infringement under the Trans-
parency Proposal is highly questionable (see para-
graph B.IV.1) when compared to the other three sets 
of principles, which require that action be taken or 
directed toward a State for its courts to exercise ju-
risdiction over an infringement claim. 
106 Section 204(2) of the ALI Principles and Article 203(2) 
of the Joint Korean and Japanese Proposal establish 
escape clauses that allow for escape jurisdiction 
when it is possible to demonstrate that the defen-
dant did not direct his activities to the state of infrin-
gement of the IPR. Indeed, this escape clause is not 
literally structured as an escape clause, but rather as 
a rule on the extent of jurisdiction. Thus, according 
to these clauses the courts at the place of the infrin-
gement can adjudicate claims related to the injuries 
occurring in that state where the infringement was 
directed against that state. So, it seems that if the in-
fringement was not directed to that state the court 
can not exercise jurisdiction. Thus, these rules pose 
escape clauses to the jurisdiction at the place of the 
infringement. However, the structure of the rules 
does not make it so clear to establish who has the 
burden for proving that the activities were directed 
(or not directed) to a particular state. But it seems to 
follow from the sense of the rule that the burden for 
establishing that the jurisdiction does not exist lies 
on the defendant contesting jurisdiction.
107 The scope of the provision under the Joint Korean 
and Japanese Proposal is somewhat obscure. Hence, 
the first sentence of Article 203(1) starts by granting 
jurisdiction to the courts of the state of the infrin-
gement i.e. the place of the results. Then the second 
sentence of Article 203(1) grants jurisdiction at the 
place of the action for multistate infringements. Fi-
nally, Article 203(2) comes back to the jurisdiction 
at the place of the infringement but specifies that 
where the activities are directed there the scope of 
jurisdiction is the injuries that occurred in that state. 
Thus, it is not so clear what the scope of jurisdiction 
is at the place of the infringement (first sentence of 
Article 203(1)) when the activities are not directed 
there (Article 203(2) is inapplicable) and the infrin-
gement is not a multistate infringement (the second 
sentence of Article 203(1) is inapplicable). It seems 
then possible to rely on the Comments to the Joint 
Korean and Japanese Proposal to interpret the first 
sentence of Article 203(1) as an Article on jurisdic-
tion at the place of the action, so that Article 203(2) 
could be adopted as a rule related to jurisdiction at 
the place of the infringement. However, even so it 
is not clear which is the scope of jurisdiction at the 
place of the action. 
108 Finally, the 2001 Draft of the Hague Judgment Con-
vention is similar to the corresponding rules of the 
ALI Principles, the Joint Korean and Japanese Pro-
posal, and the CLIP Principles, as the Nygh/Pocar 
Report emphasises. This is because the plaintiff will 
only be able to bring the action at the place of the 
result when the person “alleged to be responsible 
could reasonably have foreseen injurious conse-
quences from his act or omission in that place”.119 
This escape clause renders it very clear that the de-
fendant bears the burden for establishing that the 
injury was not reasonably foreseeable.
109 With particular regard to centralised jurisdiction, 
the following can be said. All sets of Principles al-
low for centralized jurisdiction under certain requi-
rements. Their approach is very much to be welco-
med. In fact, centralized jurisdiction is completely 
in line with the need to overcome fragmentation of 
jurisdiction which leads to extremely costly and in-
efficient results. The centralization of jurisdiction is 
also in line with the Hague Draft Convention appro-
ach. Firstly, it allows for centralised jurisdiction in 
the State where the result occurs or may occur, un-
der Article 10(5), if the injured party has “his or her 
habitual residence” in that same state. This is further 
discussed below in this paragraph, including import-
ant criticisms of this approach. 
110 Furthermore, it seems that the 2001 Draft of the Ha-
gue Judgment Convention allows for the centralised 
jurisdiction of the entire infringement at the place 
of the action, under Article 10(2). This is because, 
firstly, centralized jurisdiction is explicitly ruled out 
for the State where the result occurs (apart from 
when there is the above exception regarding the 
plaintiff’s domicile), and it is not explicitly ruled 
out for the State where the action occurs. Secondly, 
the limitations imposed in Article 10(2) can be inter-
preted so that as long as the claim relates to an in-
fringement arising from an activity that has occur-
red in that State, and the defendant has engaged in 
significant or frequent activity in that State, or has 
directed such activity to that State, and the overall 
connection of the defendant to that State makes it 
reasonable for the defendant to be sued there, then 
the court in that State can have jurisdiction over all 
the resulting injuries from that activity, no matter 
where they occur. 
111 As mentioned above, the Hague Preliminary Draft 
Convention of 1999 granted unlimited jurisdiction 
to the court at the place of the plaintiff’s domicile 
in Article 10(4), the precursor to the 2001 Draft’s Ar-
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ticle 10(5), intended as a forum delicti. All states party 
to the Convention would need to recognize the judg-
ment given at the place where the plaintiff has his or 
her “habitual residence.”120 This approach was cri-
ticized, since in internet cases particularly, it would 
have allowed the plaintiff, typically the right owner, 
to start infringement proceedings with centralized 
jurisdiction before the courts of his home state, es-
tablishing as such a probably exorbitant forum acto-
ris.121 Indeed, the ECJ in the eDate case followed ex-
actly the same approach, even though the extension 
of this judgment to IPRs cases is debated.122 In any 
case, it is laudable the approach of all of the sets of 
Principles here examined, in that they avoid gran-
ting centralized jurisdiction at the forum actoris.123 
Finally, it is important to remember that centrali-
zed jurisdiction can also be established at the place 
of the defendant’s domicile by virtue of the general 
jurisdiction criterion or before the court chosen by 
the parties.124 Where centralized jurisdiction can-
not be grounded, the alternative is the “reasonable 
application of the mosaic approach”,125 namely clai-
ming for damages or asking for territorially restric-
ted injunctions in the most relevant jurisdiction to 
stop the defendant’s infringing activities. In fact, ter-
ritorially limited injunctions can be granted even in 
Internet cases,126 as it is stated explicitly by the CLIP 
Principles in Art.2:604.127 
112 In this framework, the following remarks will the-
refore highlight certain criticisms of single aspects 
of each relevant rule, with the sole aim of trying to 
reach a common understanding of how and where 
centralized jurisdiction should be established in the 
future.
113 The ALI Principles, the CLIP Principles, the Japanese 
Transparency Proposal and the Joint Korean and Ja-
panese Proposal set forth the general principle that 
infringement jurisdiction should only extend to the 
territory of the State where the ground for attribu-
ting such jurisdiction exists. However, all four of the 
Principles allow for the adjudication of the infringe-
ment in its entirety in certain cases. The ALI Princi-
ples and the Joint Korean and Japanese Proposal al-
low for the consolidation of claims of infringements 
when specified circumstances are met, however the 
infringement is perpetrated, while the CLIP Princip-
les and the Japanese Transparency Proposal only al-
low for consolidation with respect to infringements 
spread through ubiquitous media. 
114 Yet, the ubiquitous infringement rule of the CLIP 
Principles is somewhat stricter than the correspon-
ding rule of the Transparency Proposal. The relevant 
rule of the Transparency Proposal operates indepen-
dently from the fact that the activities allegedly cau-
sing the infringement have substantial effect in the 
State or States where the alleged infringer is habitu-
ally resident, whereas the CLIP Principles rule requi-
res that the activities allegedly causing the ubiqui-
tous infringement have no substantial effect in the 
State or States where the alleged infringer is habitu-
ally resident. However, like the Transparency Propo-
sal, the CLIP Principles allow for  centralized jurisdic-
tion over infringement claims before the forum State 
courts even though the activities in furtherance of 
the infringement have not been carried out within 
the territory of the forum state in its entirety, so long 
as the harm caused by the infringement in the forum 
state is substantial (CLIP Principles) or when the re-
sults of an “ubiquitous infringement” are maximi-
zed or are to be maximized in Japan (Transparency). 
115 In any case, the rules of the CLIP Principles and of the 
Transparency Proposal on ubiquitous infringements 
might have a tendency to privilege plaintiffs who are 
resident in large and economically strong States. In 
fact, such plaintiffs will frequently be in a position 
to show that substantial harm or that the result of 
the infringement, respectively, was caused and oc-
curred in the domestic market, thus giving them an 
advantage over plaintiffs residing in countries where 
the dimension of market, and accordingly the harm 
done, is regularly smaller. 
116 Additionally, under the CLIP Principles, the clause 
that the activities allegedly causing the infringement 
do not have substantial effects in the State or Sta-
tes where the alleged infringer is habitually resident 
seems to be too strict. 
117 Furthermore, it is not clear enough if the notion of 
place of the results also includes the place where the 
economic damages are suffered. This is particularly 
true for the Transparency Proposal, since the terri-
toriality understanding of IPRs infringement of the 
CLIP Principles should avoid this outcome. 
118 Finally, it may be criticized the limitation of centra-
lized jurisdiction to ubiquitous infringements, since 
it seems that even multi-territorial infringements 
related to traditional communication means, non 
ubiquitous, deserve consolidation of proceedings. 
It seems therefore appropriate to propose rules re-
levant both in the real world and on the Internet. 
119 In fact, the ubiquitous nature of the Internet does 
not change the problems posed by a country by 
country approach, but rather only offers cases that 
are truly global in nature, providing for a much wi-
der number128 of potentially exclusive competent 
fora (and applicable laws), thereby increasing the 
cost and inefficiency of enforcing one’s IPRs.129 In 
fact, it is evident that the Internet is by definition 
borderless and, as such, it clashes with the territo-
rial approach that is proper in the IP field .130 
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120 Yet, most of the difficulties posed by Internet “are 
of a substantial law nature”,131 rather than of a PIL 
character, and are similar to those that arose with 
respect to satellite broadcasting: “Where is the copy 
made? How relevant are the various stages of the 
pulling, sending and downloading of information? 
Where does in essence the infringement take place 
if what the statute describes as one act of copying or 
communication to the public falls apart in several ac-
tivities taking place in different jurisdictions? Copy-
right [substantive] law needs to define what exactly 
is the act of copying or communication to the public 
in the technological context of [the] [I]nternet.”132 
121 Additionally, the assumption that the Internet is not 
bound by territorial limitations has been countered 
by the efforts of governments, supported by private 
parties, which have attempted to make the territo-
rial scope of regulation and enforcement on the In-
ternet mirror the geographical limits of the physi-
cal world i.a through the adoption of “geolocation 
tools”.133 It is evident that the practice of a user vie-
wing the Internet as if he/she is located in a coun-
try other than the one where he/she is physically 
present, so called “cybertravel”, frustrates all those 
efforts as well as the effectiveness of geolocation 
tools.134 Yet, the legal status of cybertravel is highly 
unclear as of yet, since neither national or interna-
tional legislatures have drafted laws governing cy-
bertravel, nor have courts been presented with cy-
bertravel cases. On one hand, it is possible to purport 
that “cybertravel should be analogized to physical 
travel, and that the benefits that society enjoys th-
rough physical travel correspond in large measure to 
the benefits provided for by cybertravel. Therefore 
cybertravel should enjoy the constitutionally protec-
ted right to travel, and should be subject to reason-
able governmental regulation, as in any other inter-
national travel.”135 However, with respect to IPRs, it 
seems plausible that cybertravel disputes will define 
the next generation of transborder cases where IPRs 
holders will claim it is illegal to make content avai-
lable to an audience that was not intended to have 
access to it.136 
122 In this light, the aim of the rules of the Joint Korean 
and Japanese Proposal and of the ALI Principles to 
propose solutions relevant both in the real world 
and on the Internet is to be approved. 
123 With respect to the ALI Principles the forum at the 
place of the activity is understood as “mostly coin-
cide[nt] with one of the defendant’s domicile.”137 In 
addition, this forum is criticised for Internet infrin-
gements, since the place of the server can be ma-
nipulated too easily; webspace and other host ser-
vices are typically offered by third parties that are 
acting in a state other than the one of the person 
that uploads the infringing material; and it is usually 
difficult to prove where this uploading took place.138 
Those critics believe that the place of the result, 
rather than of the act, should be the jurisdictional 
ground in the context of the internet.139 In addition, 
the result should be intended according to the mar-
ket impact rule as being the place of the effects that 
the alleged infringing act would have upon the fo-
rum, rather than the physical territorial connection 
to the forum.140 The same can be said with respect to 
the corresponding rule of the Joint Korean and Japa-
nese Proposal (Article 203), as is established also by 
the Comments to this same rule. It is therefore also 
in light of these criticisms that the Transparency 
Proposal and the CLIP Principles corresponding ru-
les adopt the place of the result as a jurisdiction cri-
terion (the CLIP Principles, however, as an alterna-
tive one to the place of the activity). 
124 Also the other jurisdiction criterion that determines 
a centralised jurisdiction is criticised, namely the ALI 
Principles additional forum in the court of a state in 
which the defendant is neither domiciled nor acted 
substantially if he has directed his activity to that 
state, is doing business in that state and cannot be 
sued in a WTO-member-state under any of the infrin-
gement jurisdiction relevant rules (defendant’s do-
micile, prorogation of jurisdiction and the place of 
activity rule). In fact, first the assumption on which 
the rules is based that the claimant’s interests are 
better protected in a WTO-member-state does not 
convince since “even a quick reading of the current 
list of WTO-member-states casts serious doubt on 
this presumption.”141 Second, in any case it is said 
to be inconceivable that the defendant domiciled in 
a non WTO-member-state directs his activities to 
another country where he does not do business.142 
In other words, this criterion of territorially unli-
mited jurisdiction merely grounds the jurisdiction 
of the court of the state to which the services were 
directed and only if the alleged infringer was domi-
ciled and acted only in non-WTO-member states.143
V. Declaratory actions
1. Differences
125 Declaratory actions are filed usually by the plaintiff 
seeking to establish first that the defendant owes 
him damages for a tort committed, without spe-
cifying the amount due, since the computation may 
take place in subsequent proceedings between the 
same parties or in an out-of-court agreement. Also 
in a contractual relationship, the plaintiff may seek 
a declaration that the defendant is bound by the 
agreement. In addition, a plaintiff can seek a decla-
ration that she or he has no contractual obligation 
or is not perpetrating any infringement. 
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126 Section 213 of the ALI Principles and Article 2:602 
of the CLIP Principles stipulate that declaratory 
actions in relation to non-infringements of IPRs may 
be brought on the same terms as actions seeking 
substantive relief. The other sets of Principles do 
not explicitly address declaratory actions, nor does 
the 2001 Draft of the Hague Judgment Convention.
2. Rationale
127 Section 213 of the ALI Principles and Article 2:602 of 
the CLIP Principles stipulate that declaratory actions 
may be brought on the same terms as actions seeking 
substantive relief, and the other sets of Principles 
do not expressly address declaratory actions. The 
most appropriate forum for dealing with declaratory 
actions is the same forum that would have been 
competent for hearing a corresponding claim for 
positive remedies. Yet, if the object of the claim is to 
establish that an infringement has neither occurred 
nor is threatened, a literal understanding of the 
sections of the sets of Principles that do not deal with 
declaratory actions but rather regulate only positive 
infringement claims might lead to the result that 
courts would not have jurisdiction over negative 
declaratory actions, since the plaintiff is requesting 
the court to establish that the allegedly infringing 
activity is not occurring. 
3. International Context
128 Notwithstanding the fact that in the EU and 
EFTA legal systems there is no rule establishing 
exclusive jurisdiction rules for registered IPRs pure 
infringement issues, certain EU/EFTA Member 
States adopted the view that negative declarations 
of non-infringement fall under the exclusive 
jurisdiction rule of Article 22(4) rather than under 
the infringement jurisdiction rule of Article 5(3) of 
the Brussels System.144 This approach was adopted by 
the Italian Supreme Court in BL Macchine Automatiche 
in 2003;145 the Brussels Court of Appeal in 2000:146 
and by the Swedish Supreme Court in a Lugano 
Convention context in Flotek AB case in 2000.147 In 
this regard, the German Bundesgerichtshof recently 
requested the ECJ to give a preliminary ruling on 
the issue of declaratory actions of non-infringement 
with regards to an antitrust case148. These decisions, 
particularly those coming from the Italian Supreme 
Court, establish that declaratory actions of non-
infringement do not fall under Article 5(3) of the 
Brussels system not because these actions fall 
under the exclusive jurisdiction rules, but rather 
because the object of these actions would be 
different from those for infringement with respect 
to jurisdiction.149 This approach can be explained 
by EU-specific litigation strategies based on forum 
shopping that were developed and abused by alleged 
infringers of registered IPRs in the last decade of 
the twentieth century. These alleged infringers 
would launch proceedings seeking declarations 
of non-infringement in courts known for lengthy 
proceedings (e.g., Italian courts) or courts willing 
to hear claims involving enforcement of foreign 
IPRs (e.g., Belgian courts). By doing so, these alleged 
infringers took advantage of the lis pendens rule 
established by Article 27 of the Brussels I Regulation, 
which requires all later seized courts to stay 
proceedings if the same case between the parties was 
pending in a court in another country and ultimately 
decline jurisdiction if the first seized court asserted 
jurisdiction over the dispute. In practice, this 
prevented the rights holder, i.e. the defendant in the 
declaratory action, from enforcing his IPRs until the 
first court finished its proceeding. Thus, to reduce 
the effectiveness of those so-called “torpedoes”150 a 
number of measures have been adopted, including 
the approach followed by the Italian Supreme Court 
in the BL Macchine Automatiche,151 which regarded 
the object of proceedings for a negative declaration 
of non-infringement as being different from those 
for infringement. This meant that an Italian court 
would not consider itself as blocked by the lis pendens 
provisions in the Brussels system from adjudicating 
an infringement claim in Italy due to their being an 
earlier legal action for non-infringement brought in 
another member State.152 In any case, this approach 
was extensively criticised in literature for the same 
reasons that suggest not extending the exclusive 
jurisdiction to pure infringement proceedings of 
a positive nature.153 The same approach is to be 
criticised also because to disallow claims for negative 
declaratory actions being brought at the place where 
the harmful event occurs is inconsistent with the fact 
that corresponding actions can be brought under 
Article 5(1) of the Brussels I Regulation. Thus, the 
ECJ in the recent Fischer case (C-133/11) concluded 
that Art. 5(3) of Regulation No 44/2001 must be 
interpreted as meaning that an action for a negative 
declaration seeking to establish the absence of 
liability in tort, delict, or quasi-delict falls within the 
scope of that provision. Finally, even though Article 
97(5) of the Community Trade Mark Regulation does 
not allow claims to be bought for declaration of non-
infringement at the place where the infringement 
occurs or is threatened to occur, no corresponding 
restriction applies to Community Designs. 
129 In the US a US court must have both subject 
matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction over 
the defendant(s) to properly hear a claim.  With 
respect to subject matter jurisdiction, an action 
for a declaratory judgment of non-infringement 
can be based on the same ground of jurisdiction as 
a corresponding action seeking substantive relief. 
As recently affirmed by a Federal Circuit court in a 
case involving IPRs, subject matter jurisdiction over 
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a declaratory action is determined based on whether 
a court would have subject matter jurisdiction over 
the hypothetical claim of the Declaratory Judgment 
defendant.154  Because a court would have subject 
matter jurisdiction over the defendant’s hypothetical 
infringement claim, it would also have subject matter 
jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s declaratory action. 
However, because the claim is of non infringement in 
the US and the defendant is not domiciled in the US, 
it is necessary to demonstrate that other connecting 
factors exist between the defendant and the US 
territory to ground the personal jurisdiction over 
the defendant, like an active enforcement by the 
defendant (the IPR owner) of the IPR in question in 
the US.155 In this context, because of the fear that 
foreign patent owners could not be sued in the US 
by plaintiffs filing against them declaratory non 
infringement actions, Congress passed 35 U.S.C. 293, 
which insures that non-US patent owners are always 
subject to personal jurisdiction in Washington DC 
where they filed the US patent. 
4. Discussion
130 Only the ALI Principles and the CLIP Principles 
expressly stipulate that declaratory actions in 
relation to infringements or non-infringements may 
be brought on the same terms as actions seeking 
substantive relief. Thus, rather than leaving the 
availability of such actions open to question, these 
two proposals are very clear with respect to the rule 
governing such actions. The Transparency Proposal 
and the Joint Korean and Japanese Proposal, however, 
do not expressly address declaratory actions apart 
from actions by which the validity of a registered 
intellectual property right is challenged or sought 
to be established. However, this does not necessarily 
mean that different results would be reached on the 
basis of the respective proposals. 
VI. Civil claims arising out of 
criminal proceedings
1. Differences
131 Only the CLIP Principles explicitly address the issue 
of civil claims arising out of criminal proceedings. 
The other sets of Principles do not deal with this 
issue, nor does the 2001 Draft of the Hague Judgment 
Convention.
2. Rationale
132 Article 2:204 of the CLIP Principles clarifies that with 
regard to civil claims for remedies for infringements 
which gave rise to criminal proceedings, a court 
seized with the criminal proceedings may also have 
jurisdiction over the corresponding civil claims if such 
jurisdiction is possible according to the forum State’s 
national law. However, this rule must be applied in 
conjunction with Article 2:203; no derogation is 
granted from the rule limiting the extent of civil 
jurisdiction to the domestic territory of the forum 
state. Furthermore, in order to claim competence 
based on Article 2:204, criminal proceedings must 
already be pending as the provision only applies if a 
court is already “seized with” criminal proceedings. 
Thus the mere possibility of a court entertaining 
criminal proceedings does not provide a sufficient 
basis for assuming jurisdiction over civil claims in 
intellectual property matters.
3. International Context
133 Article 5(4) Brussels I Regulation stipulates that civil 
claims for damages or restitution based on an act 
giving rise to criminal proceedings may be brought 
in the court seized with those proceedings, if it is 
allowed under the forum State’s procedural law. This 
Article has not been applied directly to IPRs cases 
as of yet. However, two recent cases related to the 
civil claims arising out of criminal proceedings pose 
interesting international jurisdiction issues. The first 
case is a Swedish case: Pirate Bay, ruled by the Swedish 
Court of Appeal on November 26, 2010. The court 
established their international jurisdiction by reason 
of the fact that the applicable law to the primary 
crimes was the Swedish law.156 In fact, according to 
the court the crimes had been committed in Sweden 
by virtue of the uploading of the infringing files 
onto the Pirate Bay database which was located in 
Sweden. In this case, all defendants were domiciled 
in Sweden and the courts awarded the damages 
for the entire infringement without any territorial 
limitation.157 In another recent case (29.11.2011) 
the French Supreme Court ruled that French courts 
have jurisdiction to adjudicate criminal proceedings 
related to copyrights infringement only where 
French law applies to the crime in question, and 
“under the Berne Convention (Article 5(2)) the 
protection afforded an author is determined by the 
law of the state where such protection is sought, 
which means the law of the State on whose territory 
the infringing acts took place and not that of the 
state where the harm was suffered. […] In that case 
the Court found that given that the infringement 
occurred outside of France the Court of Appeal had 
misapplied the aforementioned principle.”158 
4. Discussion
134 Only the CLIP Principles explicitly addresses the 
issue of jurisdiction over corresponding civil claims 
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in a criminal suit, at Article 2:204.   However, 
this does not necessarily mean that different 
results would be reached on the basis of the other 
Principles. Although it may not be necessary for such 
jurisdiction to be exercised, Article 2:204 of CLIP does 
serve clarifying purposes, in particular insofar as it 
leaves no doubt that irrespective of the breadth of 
competence assumed with regard to the assessment 
of the criminal act, the confinements applying under 
the pertinent articles remain with regard to the civil 
claims. 
C. Exclusive Jurisdiction in 
Intellectual Property
I. PIL method adopted 
1. Differences
135 The Transparency Proposal adopts a unilateral PIL 
method, as it determines only when Japanese courts 
have international jurisdiction to hear a claim, but 
does not address when courts in other States would 
also have jurisdiction over such claims. The other 
sets of Principles adopt a multilateral method, 
which does address when national or foreign courts 
will have jurisdiction. The 2001 Draft of the Hague 
Judgment Convention also adopts a multilateral 
method, which is outlined in paragraph C.I.4 below.
2. Rationale
136 The Transparency Proposal primarily aims at the 
reform of current Japanese law, particularly with 
respect to international jurisdiction to adjudicate, 
while the other sets of Principles seek universal 
Principles on issues concerning international IPR 
law. Thus, this is why the former adopts a unilateral 
method, while the latter adopts a multilateral 
approach.159 
3. International Context
137 The international conventions on international 
jurisdiction typically seek universal Principles and 
therefore adopt a multilateral approach. 
4. Discussion
138 The Transparency Proposal adopts a unilateral 
approach, which does not give an answer  to 
the question of which court has international 
jurisdiction to address the case at stake when the 
forum state courts do not have such jurisdiction. 
While unilateralism is necessary for national rules 
on international jurisdiction, it is not suitable for 
international rules on the same topic. 
139 By contrast, the ALI Principles, the CLIP Principles, 
and the Joint Korean and Japanese Proposal adopt a 
multilateral approach for determining jurisdiction. 
Thus, each of these provides an answer for which 
other court(s) would have jurisdiction even if the 
forum state in question lacks jurisdiction.  An 
international consensus is needed if the problems 
of cross-border litigation are going to be adequately 
addressed and these proposals, by taking a 
multilateral approach, are more likely to be helpful 
in finding a unified international solution. This 
multilateral approach is supported by the 2001 Draft 
of the Hague Judgment Convention.160 
II. Territoriality. Rejection of 
exclusive jurisdiction
1. Differences
140 All four sets of Principles reject exclusive jurisdiction 
rules for claims of infringement with respect to both 
registered and unregistered IPRs. 
141 As for validity, this issue can be raised in many 
different ways. In practice, the issue of validity is 
often raised as a plea in objection in an infringement 
action. It can also be invoked in support of a 
declaratory action seeking to establish that there has 
been no infringement, as a means to establish that no 
enforceable right exists upon which the defendant 
can rely. Of course validity can also be raised 
principally by means of a claim or a counterclaim. 
The four sets of Principles reject any exclusive 
jurisdiction rules in relation to unregistered IPRs’ 
validity issues, principally or incidentally arising. 
Also, the four sets of Principles reject any exclusive 
jurisdiction rules with regard to validity issues of 
registered IPRs incidentally raised. Yet, only the 
ALI Principles and the Transparency Proposal 
reject any exclusive jurisdiction rules in relation 
to registered IPRs validity issues principally raised 
(the ALI Principles under stricter conditions, namely 
the defendant’s residence in the forum state and the 
multistate registration of the IPR involved, whereas 
no such conditions are imposed by the Transparency 
Proposal). For both the ALI Principles and the 
Transparency Proposal, however, only a decision 
in the country of registration will have erga omnes 
effect. The CLIP Principles and the Joint Korean and 
Japanese Proposal, in contrast, confirm the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the state of registration with regard 
to registered IPRs validity claims principally raised. 
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142 In other words, with respect to validity claims the 
clear implication of the approach followed by the 
four sets of Principles is that only a decision in the 
country of registration will have erga omnes effect, 
but that courts in other countries are not deprived 
of all forms of jurisdiction in this area. Inter partes 
decisions clearly are acceptable. However, the 
CLIP Principles and the Joint Korean and Japanese 
Proposal do not allow the courts in countries other 
than the State of registration to examine the validity 
of registered rights whenever that question is 
principally raised. In contrast, this is possible under 
the Transparency Proposal, which establishes that 
the Japanese courts can adjudicate the validity 
of a registered IPR, even when principally raised, 
provided that there is another basis upon which 
to ground jurisdiction in the Japanese courts. The 
same result is provided for by the ALI Principles but 
under stricter conditions, namely that the defendant 
is resident in the forum state and that the invalidity 
of the registration of the right is raised for multiple 
States.161
143 The comment to the relevant rule in the Transparency 
Proposal, Article 103, written by r Chaen, Kono and 
Yokomizo, warrants full quotation: “it is generally 
thought, in Japan as well as in foreign countries, 
that the courts of the country of registration have 
exclusive jurisdiction over actions concerning the 
registration or validity of IP rights that arise from 
registration, such as patent rights. However, the 
Transparency Proposal does not adopt this thinking, 
and recognizes that there are cases in which the 
jurisdiction of Japanese courts should be affirmed 
even where the IP right was granted under foreign 
law. However, a judgment invalidating an IP right 
granted under foreign law should not be effective 
against third parties, but only effective between the 
parties to the action.”162
144 The 2001 Draft of the Hague Judgment Convention 
seems to have influenced the approach adopted by all 
sets of Principles as far as the rejection of exclusive 
jurisdiction rules for validity issues incidentally 
raised is concerned, whereas with respect to validity 
issues principally raised the 2001 Draft of the Hague 
Judgment Convention seems to have influenced the 
approach adopted by the CLIP Principles and the 
Joint Korean and Japanese Proposal, as is discussed 
below in paragraph C.II.4. The same can be said for 
the 2005 Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, 
as is discussed below in paragraph C.II.4.
2. Rationale
145 A typical justification for exclusive jurisdiction rules 
in the context of IPRs litigation is the territorial 
nature of IPRs.163 Thus, the rejection of such rules 
by the four sets of Principles under comparison, 
even if just in part, constitutes a departure from 
the understanding of the territoriality principle as 
an international procedural rule. This departure 
is more radical with regard to the ALI Principles 
and the Transparency Proposal, since they reject 
exclusive jurisdiction rules almost entirely.  The same 
departure is softer in relation to the CLIP Principles 
and the Joint Korean and Japanese Proposal, since 
they adopt limited exclusive jurisdiction rules in 
relation to registered IPRs validity issues principally 
raised. The Comments to the Joint Korean and 
Japanese Proposal do not mention the territoriality 
principle as a justification for exclusive jurisdiction 
rules. Also, the CLIP Principles try to promote cross 
border litigation by limiting exclusive jurisdiction 
to those situations where the public law interest 
of the country of protection is truly concerned.164 
All sets of Principles explain their (total or partial) 
abandoning of exclusive jurisdiction rules in 
terms of efficiency gains. Furthermore, the ALI 
Principles ground their approach related to the 
overcoming of exclusive jurisdiction rules with 
respect to validity issues principally raised (under 
certain requirements) as a compromise between 
the reluctance to examine the acts of foreign 
public authorities and efficiency gains.165 The 
Transparency Proposal also bases the rejection of 
exclusive jurisdiction rules on the need for adequate 
dispute resolution. Furthermore, the Commentaries 
to the Transparency Proposal determine the basis 
for the existing exclusive jurisdiction rules as the 
avoidance of causing interference with the national 
sovereignty of foreign countries, and as the courts 
at the place of registration of the IPR involved 
being the best placed courts to examine its validity. 
Yet, according to those commentaries “the base 
for recognising the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
country of registration over actions concerning the 
validity of a right are not necessarily firm” and in 
any case “alone cannot justify exclusive jurisdiction 
that would, for example, preclude the international 
jurisdiction of the court of the country where the 
defendant is domiciled.”166 Thus, the Transparency 
Proposal and the ALI Principles are in agreement 
with the departure from the exclusive jurisdiction 
rule even with respect to validity issues principally 
raised. 
146 However, the ALI Principles set forth the 
prerequisites of the multiplicity of the rights and 
of the suit in the defendant’s country of residence, 
whereas the Transparency Proposal does not impose 
such requirements. The reason for this difference 
between the two sets of Principles is explained by 
the commentary on the Transparency Proposal 
according to which the prerequisites imposed by the 
ALI Principles to overcome the exclusive jurisdiction 
“are not relevant to the question of whether such 
an action may be filed in a country other than the 
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country of registration”167 and therefore are not 
imposed by the Transparency Proposal.
3. International Context
147 For a comparative analysis of States’ practices 
related to exclusive jurisdiction  rules, the author 
refers to her book on “exclusive jurisdiction in 
intellectual property”.168 Particularly, Chapter II of 
this book highlights: the almost universal absence 
of exclusive jurisdiction rules for unregistered 
IPRs claims of whatever nature in international 
instruments, as well as in EU/EFTA norms and in 
national statutory or case-law rules; the almost 
universal absence of exclusive jurisdiction rules 
in international instruments, as well as in EU/
EFTA norms and in national statutory or case-
law rules for registered IPRs infringement claims 
however raised; the prevailing absence of exclusive 
jurisdiction rules in international instruments and 
in national statutory or case-law rules, as well as the 
mitigation of the scope of the exclusive jurisdiction 
rules of the EU/EFTA Brussels system for registered 
IPRs validity claims incidentally raised; and the 
emerging rejection of exclusive jurisdiction rules 
for registered IPRs validity issues principally raised. 
148 In addition, Chapter II of the book demonstrates 
that neither the exclusive jurisdiction rules related 
to unregistered IPRs pure infringement claims and 
validity claims however raised, as well as registered 
IPRs pure infringement claims and validity claims 
incidentally raised, nor the exclusive jurisdiction 
rules related to registered IPRs validity issues 
principally raised are expression of a customary 
international law rule imposing States to adopt 
them. 
149 Finally, the book purports and develops a thesis 
already maintained in literature as well as in case-
law according to which exclusive jurisdiction rule 
are not only insufficiently supported by any of 
the arguments usually invoked in their favor, but 
actually are also contrary to the public international 
law rules on the avoidance of a denial of justice and 
on the fundamental human right of access to a court, 
and therefore should be abandoned with respect to 
infringement and validity claims involving either 
registered or unregistered IPRs. This abandonment 
would be in line with the clear already existing 
trend in this respect and would prevent economic 
inequalities in cross-border IP litigation, without 
however leading to abusive forum shopping.
4. Discussion
150 The rejection of exclusive jurisdiction rules for 
validity issues incidentally raised, proper of all sets of 
principles involved, was influenced by the 2001 Draft 
of the Hague Judgment Convention, providing that 
judgments over issues such as the grant, registration, 
validity, abandonment or revocation of foreign 
patents or marks should only have inter partes effects, 
whether the issue was principally or incidentally 
raised, in Article 12(6).169 The Nygh/Pocar Report 
on the Hague Judgment Convention states that since 
the incidentally raised issue would have no effect 
erga omnes, it would be “seriously doubted whether 
it is desirable to confer exclusive jurisdiction” in this 
situation.170 The 2005 Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreement supports this approach in Article 10, by 
saying that only a decision on validity of registered 
IPRs in the country of registration will have effect 
erga omnes.
151 The commentaries on the Transparency Proposal 
and the ALI Principles recall that “this method 
of handling the registered- rights problem was 
suggested by Curtis Bradley, writing at the behest 
of the United States State Department negotiators 
of the Hague Judgments Draft.171 He distinguished 
between rights among individuals and rights against 
the world. Under his proposal to the Hague drafters, 
parties would be allowed to litigate their entire case 
in any court that has jurisdiction under the general 
terms of these Principles. However, if the case were 
litigated outside the State where the right was 
deposited or registered, the ‘status or validity of the 
deposit or registration of . . . rights [would have] 
effect as between the parties only.’”172
152 Based on the above arguments against territoriality 
interpreted as an international jurisdiction criterion, 
the approach of all sets of Principles rejecting the 
notion of territoriality as the basis for exclusive 
jurisdiction rules is to be welcomed. Similarly, the 
approach of the sets of Principles that grounds the 
rejection of exclusive jurisdiction rules on efficiency 
gains is a good one, since as already argued, 
exclusive jurisdiction rules lead to an unreasonable 
and inefficient duplication of proceedings. Having 
said that, the ALI Principles and the Transparency 
Proposal appear to follow the preferable approach, 
since they abandon exclusive jurisdiction rules also 
with regard to validity issues principally raised. Thus, 
a plaintiff domiciled in Japan could rise principally 
before a Japanese court a validity issue related to a 
foreign patent of a competitor domiciled in Japan, 
for instance. In this case the competent Japanese 
court could establish the validity or invalidity of the 
patent at stake irrespective of its being of a foreign 
nature. In this regard, then, the parties could have 
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their dispute settled at home, even though the 
effects of the judgment will be of a limited nature 
with respect to third parties and even to the same 
parties in the future, if the Japanese court declares 
the foreign patent invalid. 
III. Notion of exclusive (or subject 
matter) jurisdiction rules
1. Differences
153  The ALI Principles adopt the notion of subject-
matter jurisdiction, whereas the CLIP Principles 
and the Joint Korean and Japanese Proposal refer to 
exclusive jurisdiction. The Transparency Proposal 
refers simply to international jurisdiction, since it 
does not pose any exclusive jurisdiction rule. These 
differences reflect the fact that each set of Principles 
is rooted in a different legal system. Yet, these 
differences are more of a terminology nature rather 
than one of content, and in fact the different systems 
involved lead to similar results in this respect. For 
a detailed examination of the systems adopting the 
notions of exclusive or respectively subject-matter 
jurisdiction and on the similar results reached by 
both of them, the author refers to paragraph two 
of her book and the literature and case-law recalled 
thereby.173  
154 The 2001 Draft of the Hague Judgment Convention 
and the 2005 Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreements take the same approach as the CLIP 
Principles and the Joint Korean and Japanese 
Proposal, as is discussed in paragraph C.III.4 below. 
2. Rationale
155 The different sets of Principles do not clarify why 
they refer to the notion of exclusive jurisdiction or to 
the one of subject matter jurisdiction. The different 
approaches adopted by the four sets of Principles in 
this respect clearly derive from their being rooted 
in different legal systems.174 
3. International Context
156 See para 2 of the author’s book referred to supra at 
C.III.1.
4. Discussion
157 Based on the above arguments against exclusive 
jurisdiction, the approach of the ALI Principles and 
the Transparency Proposal is preferable, as they do 
not refer to the notion of an exclusive jurisdiction 
rule.
158 By referring to “the courts of the Contracting 
State of grant or registration” having “exclusive 
jurisdiction”, Alternative A of the 2001 Draft of the 
Hague Judgment Convention175 adopts the notion 
of exclusive jurisdiction.  The 2005 Convention on 
Choice of Court Agreements also acknowledges the 
notion of exclusive jurisdiction, in Article 3.
IV. Notion of registered rights
1. Differences
159 The CLIP Principles ground the exclusive jurisdiction 
in the courts of the State where the right has been 
registered or is deemed to have been registered under the 
terms of an international convention (Art.2:401.1). 
The Japanese Transparency Proposal refers to 
“rights prescribed under Japanese law (including 
intellectual property rights that are deemed to be 
granted under Japanese law pursuant to the provisions 
of an international treaty)” (103.1) (emphasis added). 
By contrast, the ALI Principles (Section 213.2) and 
the Joint Korean and Japanese Proposal (Art.209.1) 
refer only to the “State of registration”, but provide 
no further specification.
160 The 2001 Draft of the Hague Judgment Convention 
is similar to the ALI Principles and the Joint Korean 
and Japanese Proposal in this respect, and is discus-
sed further in paragraph C.IV.4 below. 
2. Rationale
161 The different sets of Principles do not clarify why 
they do or do not refer to IPRs deemed to have been 
registered in the forum state by virtue of the rules 
of an international treaty. 
3. International Context
162 See para 2 of the author’s book referred to supra at 
para C.III.1. 
4. Discussion
163 For the sake of clarity, the Principles that explicitly 
include rights that are deemed to have been registe-
red under the terms of an international convention 
within their definition of registered rights, namely 
the CLIP Principles and the Transparency Proposal, 
are preferable.
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164 The 2001 Draft of the Hague Judgment Convention176 
refers only to “the Contracting State of grant or re-
gistration” in Alternative A. However, the Nygh/
Pocar Report to the Hague Judgment Convention 
states that the Convention includes the notion of 
“courts of the Contracting State in which according 
to an international Convention the deposit or regist-
ration is deemed to have taken place”.177 This refers 
to the earlier 1999 version of the Draft Convention, 
and this reference was removed in the 2001 version.
V. Matters included in the rules 
governing exclusive jurisdiction
1. Differences
165 Each of the following Principles establish different 
matters that fall under their respective subject mat-
ter jurisdiction rules. The ALI Principles talk about “a 
proceeding brought to obtain a declaration of inva-
lidity” being subject to exclusive jurisdiction, in Ar-
ticle 213(2). Article 2:401 of the CLIP Principles ad-
opts a more explicit approach, and stipulates that 
exclusive jurisdiction applies to “disputes having as 
their object a judgment on the grant, registration, 
validity, abandonment or revocation of a patent, a 
mark, an industrial design or any other intellectual 
property right”. Article 209 of the Joint Korean and 
Japanese Proposal establishes exclusive jurisdiction 
over “any dispute arising out of acquiring, registe-
ring, disclaiming or revoking and validity of intel-
lectual property rights”. Article 103 (1) of the Trans-
parency Proposal applies to “actions concerning the 
existence, registration, validity or ownership of in-
tellectual property rights”, but rejects exclusive ju-
risdiction rules for any of these issues. 
166 The 2001 Draft of the Hague Judgment Convention 
supports the approach taken by the CLIP Principles 
and the Joint Korean and Japanese Proposal in this 
respect, and is discussed in paragraph C.V.4 below. 
167 The notion of exclusive jurisdiction adopted by all 
three sets of Principles (excluding the Transparency 
Proposal) only covers the aspects of foreign IPRs liti-
gation178 namely the IPR subsistence, scope, validity 
and registration.179 It excludes disputes that can af-
fect some of those issues but where the real object 
of the litigation180 is different. This is notwithstan-
ding the fact that they may result in decisions that 
can be the basis for changes in the records of the re-
gistries of a State,181 namely inter alia IPRs first ow-
nership and entitlement issues,182 as well as transfer-
ability and assignability matters and the contractual 
transfer of ownership.183 In fact, it is true that the 
Transparency Proposal mentions those last issues to-
gether with the validity matters. As for the subsis-
tence, scope, validity and registration notions inclu-
ded in exclusive jurisdiction rules, they relate inter 
alia to the definition of the various categories of pro-
tected works, the originality, novelty and legal requi-
rements, the granting, the fixation, the registration 
(including its abandonment or revocation) and the 
scope of protection, namely the various exclusive 
rights and the way in which they are defined and li-
mited as well as the term of the right in question.184 
168 For present purposes the notions of subsistence, vali-
dity, registration and scope of an IPR will be recalled 
together under the category of “validity”, for simpli-
city reasons, unless specified differently.
2. Rationale
169 The different terminology adopted to designate the 
matters governed by the subject-matter jurisdiction 
rules reflects the many basic elements that relate to 
the existence and validity of an IPR and which can 
each serve as a basis for challenging whether all the 
criteria were met for establishing the right, in par-
ticular the registration and whether the right was 
validly granted.185
170 Indeed, the CLIP Principles avoid the vague wording 
“validity” and designate explicitly the matters fal-
ling under exclusive jurisdiction rules as it shows 
clearly the limited number of scenarios that may 
give rise to exclusive jurisdiction. Furthermore, ac-
cording to the Comments to the Joint Korean and 
Japanese Proposal, the terminology adopted by the 
Proposal to determine the claims falling under their 
exclusive jurisdiction rule (“any dispute arising out 
of acquiring, registering, disclaiming or revoking 
and validity of intellectual property rights”) reflects 
the aim of “drawing upon a comprehensive review 
of similar concerned provisions” of the other four 
sets of Principles’ corresponding rules.
3. International Context
171 See para 2 of the authors book referred to supra at 
para C.III.1. 
4. Discussion
172 Even though the CLIP Principles and the Joint Korean 
and Japanese Proposal adopt exclusive jurisdiction 
rules, they try to limit those rules in an applaudable 
way, as both avoid the vague wording of “validity” 
and instead explicitly designate the matters falling 
under the rules on excusive jurisdiction, as well as 
the rules on the limited effects of the judgments on 
foreign IPRs “validity” matters. Thus, by being more 
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precise, the CLIP Principles and the Joint Korean and 
Japanese Proposal clearly and narrowly circumscribe 
exclusive jurisdiction rules or rules on limited effects 
of the judgments to be rendered. Furthermore, those 
Principles are in line with the 2001 Draft of the Ha-
gue Judgment Convention, Alternative A, which re-
fers to the notions of judgment “on the grant, regis-
tration, validity, abandonment, revocation […] of a 
patent or a mark.”186  
VI. Legal actions included in the 
exclusive jurisdiction rules
1. Differences
173 As well as determining the matters which fall wit-
hin their subject matter jurisdiction, which were di-
scussed above in paragraph C.I.5, each set of Princip-
les also determines different procedural actions that 
fall under their exclusive jurisdiction rules. Section 
213(1) of the ALI Principles refers to “a declaratory 
judgment […] to declare a registered right invalid”, 
and Section 213(2) refers to “a proceeding brought 
to obtain a declaration of the invalidity” of a regis-
tered IPR. Article 2:401 of the CLIP Principles stipu-
lates that exclusive jurisdiction applies to “disputes 
having as their object a judgment on the grant, re-
gistration, validity, abandonment or revocation of a 
patent, a mark, an industrial design or any other in-
tellectual property right protected on the basis of re-
gistration” when raised as a principal claim or coun-
terclaim. Article 209 of the Joint Korean and Japanese 
Proposal states that exclusive jurisdiction applies to 
“[a]ny dispute arising out of acquiring, registering, 
disclaiming or revoking and validity of intellectual 
property rights,” except when such questions arise 
in a context other than “in a context of a prelimi-
nary or incidental question”. By contrast, as previ-
ously discussed, the Transparency Proposal governs 
“actions concerning the existence, registration, va-
lidity or ownership of intellectual property rights” 
(Article 103), but does not establish any exclusive ju-
risdiction rules for these actions regardless of how 
they are raised.
174 The 2001 Draft of the Hague Judgment Convention 
supports the specific approach taken by the CLIP 
Principles, as is discussed below in paragraph C.VI.4. 
However, the 2005 Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreements, adopts a much less specific term for 
judgments on intellectual property rights, and re-
fers only to them as “a ruling on the validity of an 
intellectual property right.”
175 For the present purposes for simplicity, the following 
remarks will adopt the terms “validity claims” or 
“validity proceedings”, “inter partes effects” and “va-
lidity issues incidentally raised”, which are intended 
to be comprehensive, unless specified differently.
2. Rationale
176 Even though the CLIP Principles adopt an exclusive 
jurisdiction rule, they try to limit those rules in an 
applaudable way, by avoiding the vague wording of 
“actions concerned with” and “proceedings related 
to,” and instead designating explicitly the actions 
falling under the rules on exclusive jurisdiction and 
the rules on the limited effects of the judgments on 
foreign IPRs “validity” matters with the stipulation 
that these actions shall “have as their object” the 
interested claims. Thus, by being more precise, the 
CLIP Principles clearly and narrowly circumscribe 
exclusive jurisdiction rules and rules on limited ef-
fects of the judgments to be rendered.
3. International Context
177 See para 2 of the author’s book referred to supra at 
C.III.1. 
4. Discussion
178 The differences in the language of the ALI, CLIP and 
Joint Principles leads to the question of how closely 
the procedural action must be connected to the 
question of validity or registration before the exclu-
sive jurisdiction clause applies. Hence, “proceedings 
brought to obtain a declaration” under the ALI Prin-
ciples; claims “having as their object a judgment” un-
der the CLIP Principles; and “disputes arising out of” 
under the Joint Korean and Japanese Proposal may 
each be interpreted to govern different legal actions, 
leading to different results.
179 Indeed, the CLIP Principles adopt the terminology 
“having as their object”, which could make the li-
mitation clear and exclude cases where the issues of 
validity and registration are only slightly related to 
the real purpose of litigation.  This approach is also 
supported by the 2001 Draft of the Hague Judgment 
Convention,187 Alternative A, which provides for 
exclusive jurisdiction “in which the relief sought is 
a judgment on the grant, registration, validity, aban-
donment, revocation […] of a patent or a mark.”188 
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VII. Effects of the judgments 
adopted on foreign IPRs 
validity issues
1. Differences
180 Each set of Principles determines differently the 
effects of the judgments which concern the vali-
dity of foreign registered IPRs. According to para-
graph 211(2) of the ALI Principles, “the adjudication 
of the validity of registered rights granted under 
the laws of another State is effective only to resolve 
the dispute among the parties of the action”. Article 
2:401(2) of the CLIP Principles stipulates that “the de-
cisions resulting from […] disputes” on validity or re-
gistration of registered IPRs that arose in a context 
other than by principal claim or counterclaim “do 
not affect the validity or registration of those rights 
as against third parties.” This rule shall be coordina-
ted with Article 4:202 of the same Principles on “va-
lidity and registration”, according to which “recog-
nition and enforcement of a foreign judgment may 
not be refused on the ground that in the proceed-
ings before the court of origin the validity or regis-
tration of an intellectual property right registered in 
a State other than the State of origin was challenged, 
provided that the recognition and enforcement pro-
duces effects concerning validity or registration only 
with regard to the dispute between the parties”. Ar-
ticle 103(3) of the Transparency Proposal stipulates 
that “judgments invalidating intellectual property 
rights prescribed under foreign law shall only be ef-
fective as between the parties to the action”. Article 
209(2) of the Joint Korean and Japanese Proposal sta-
tes that “the decisions resulting from those disputes” 
which arose in “the context of preliminary or inci-
dental questions” “do not affect later claims”. The 
comments to the Joint Korean and Japanese Propo-
sal clarify that “even for the parties in such dispute, 
the decision rendered by the court that has exclusive 
jurisdiction derived from these Principles ought to 
prevail over that rendered by any other court, and 
the decisions in preliminary questions do not affect 
the subsequent proceedings.”189
181 The limitation of the effect of the judgment to the 
parties of the proceeding with respect to the action 
at stake is similar to the one adopted by the 2001 
Draft of the Hague Judgment Convention, which is 
discussed below in paragraph C.VII.4.
182 The four sets of Principles do not explicitly specify 
the scope of the judgments rendered by the courts of 
the State of registration on validity issues principally 
raised. Yet, this scope can be established by referring 
to the rules of each set of Principles which limit judg-
ments concerning the validity of IPRs granted under 
the laws of other States to be effective only inter par-
tes, with some variation in the extent of this limita-
tion. Thus, a logical interpretation of these rules de-
termines that the decisions rendered by the courts 
of the State of registration affect the validity of the 
IPRs at stake not only between the parties of the pro-
ceedings, but also as against third parties, and the-
refore have an erga omnes effect.
183 In addition to the State of registration, the ALI Prin-
ciples provide that a plaintiff may also principally 
challenge the validity of IPRs arising in multiple 
countries in the State where the defendant is resi-
dent. The Transparency Proposal stipulates that Ja-
panese courts have international jurisdiction over 
validity claims principally raised concerning IPRs 
granted under foreign law, provided that there is 
another basis for jurisdiction in the Japanese courts, 
such as (but not only) the defendant being domici-
led in Japan. Both the ALI Principles and the Trans-
parency Proposal limit the scope of judgments con-
cerning validity when rendered by the courts of the 
State other than the one which granted the IPR to 
the parties of the action. 
184 The four sets of Principles provide for jurisdiction 
over issues concerning the validity of registered 
rights that are incidentally raised in the courts com-
petent to address the related principal claims, e.g., 
infringement proceedings or contractual actions. 
Once again, each of the Principles limits the scope 
of the judgments rendered by these courts, stipula-
ting that the effects of the judgments on rights regis-
tered in States other than the forum will be limited 
to the parties of the action (with slight differences). 
185 Article 2:402 of the CLIP Principles establishes that 
when a court is seized of a claim which is subject to 
the exclusive jurisdiction of another court in a dif-
ferent state, by virtue of Article 2:401, the first court 
mentioned shall declare of its own motion that it has 
no jurisdiction. While the other sets of Principles do 
not deal with this procedural matter explicitly, they 
would presumably reach the same result. 
2. Rationale
186 The sets of principles at stake confine the legal ef-
fects of the decision on validity of foreign registe-
red IPRs to the parties to the proceeding. The ALI 
Principles are generally interpreted as intending to 
confine the legal effects of the decisions over va-
lidity of foreign IPRs to the parties of the procee-
dings as necessary to maintain the balance between 
the interests of various stakeholders (right-holders, 
other parties to the proceedings and states) while 
making sure that the sovereign interests of the gran-
ting State are not undermined.190 Sovereignty con-
siderations  are invoked also by the Commentary 
on the Transparency Proposal according to which 
“a judgment invalidating a foreign IP right that is 
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effective against third parties would likely be con-
sidered interference with the national sovereignty 
of this foreign country.”191 Regarding the CLIP Prin-
ciples, confining legal effects of the decisions over 
validity of foreign IPRs to the parties of the procee-
dings is necessary to avoid amendment of registers 
based on a ruling by a foreign court that has erga om-
nes effect. Thus, in other words, according to this ar-
gument, proceedings having as their object the va-
lidity or legality of entries in these public registers 
cannot be recognised in the country where the re-
gister is kept.192
3. International Context
187 See chapters II and V of the authors book referred 
to supra at C.III.1. 
4. Discussion
188 As already seen, the ALI Principles, the CLIP Princip-
les and the Joint Korean and Japanese Proposal con-
fine the legal effects of the decision on validity of for-
eign registered IPRs to the parties to the proceeding. 
The Transparency Proposal has adopted the prefer-
able approach, by limiting the effects of the judg-
ments only when they invalidate foreign IPRs but 
not limiting those effects when they declare the fo-
reign IPRs valid. The 2001 Draft of the Hague Judg-
ment Convention provides that decisions related to 
the validity of foreign IPRs incidentally raised would 
have no binding effect in subsequent proceedings, 
even if they are between the same parties, according 
to Article 12(6), Alternatives A and B.193 Article 10 of 
the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreement 
of 2005 confirms this approach.194 The 2005 Conven-
tion does not deprive courts in countries other than 
the country of registration of all forms of jurisdic-
tion in this area, and particularly allows courts to 
exercise jurisdiction with inter partes decisions on 
foreign registered IPRs validity claims incidentally 
raised.  However, under this Convention, a validity 
decision concerning a registered IPR only has erga 
omnes effect if rendered in the country of registra-
tion. Therefore the Hague Draft Convention and the 
Hague Convention of 2005 are in agreement with the 
approach taken by all sets of principles with respect 
to validity issues incidentally raised.
189 With respect to the rejection of exclusive jurisdiction 
rules for validity issues principally raised and the in-
ter partes effect of the relevant judgments, evident 
in the ALI Principles and the Transparency Propo-
sal only, it is relevant to recall a criticism addressed 
to the Transparency Proposal, but that could be ex-
tended, mutatis mutandis, to the same rejection of the 
ALI Principles. According to this criticism the rejec-
tion of exclusive jurisdiction in validity issues prin-
cipally raised would be useless195 and would not ful-
fil the requirement posed i.a. by Japanese law of the 
procedural interests of the parties. The criticism at 
stake does not render immediately clear why it re-
aches those conclusions, but it seems reasonable to 
understand it as being based on the limited effects 
of the judgment on the validity of a foreign IPR prin-
cipally raised. In other words, since the judgment 
on validity does not bind either third parties or the 
same parties with respect to their future actions, the 
judgment would be completely ineffective. 
190 Yet, this criticism does not convince. In fact, even 
if the judgment of the court binds only to the par-
ties and does not prevent their future legal actions, 
it seems that this judgment will still become res ju-
dicata for the parties with respect to its object. In 
other words, should one of the parties want to raise 
the validity issue related to the foreign IPR involved 
once again, the claimant should challenge said va-
lidity on the basis of reasons and arguments diffe-
rent than the ones that constituted the object of the 
judgment which became res judicata.  Furthermore, 
according to the Transparency Proposal the limita-
tion of effects of the judgment at stake involves only 
the judgment on invalidity, but does not concern the 
judgments on validity, rendering it clear that those 
will bind (at least) the parties on future claims. Also, 
according to the commentary on the ALI Princip-
les the limitation of the effects of judgments on for-
eign IPRs validity issues to the parties of the dispute 
“may not result in as much duplicative litigation as 
might appear at first blush, for once the court of one 
commercially significant jurisdiction declares a fo-
reign patent invalid, the patentee cannot easily en-
force the right, or counterpart rights, against any 
other party.”196  Finally, it is perfectly conceivable 
that the parties will comply voluntarily with a judg-
ment on validity of a foreign IPR, being for instance 
just in need of legal certainty and aiming at avoi-
ding further litigation between themselves, especi-
ally when the IPRs at stake are registered in many 
different jurisdictions. In fact, their voluntary com-
pliance would prevent them from raising the vali-
dity issue of the IPR at stake in various different legal 
systems, with the risk of initiating inefficient pro-
ceedings, which are usually extremely costly and 
lead to divergent outcomes.197 So, the limitation of 
effects of the judgments on foreign registered IPRs 
validity issues principally raised adopted by the ALI 
Principles and by the Transparency Proposal is not 
sufficient enough to indicate that their rejection of 
exclusive jurisdiction rules is useless. 
191 On the contrary, the same limitation of effects seems 
to be criticisable for the same reasons that the  exclu-
sive jurisdiction rules are criticised. In fact, the said 
limitation of effects is probably grounded on sover-
eignty reasons by the Commentary on the ALI Prin-
ciples and by the Transparency Proposal, whereas it 
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is based on the need to avoid the amendment of fo-
reign registers in the case of the CLIP Principles.198 
However, as already mentioned, sovereignty rea-
sons and arguments related to the amendment of fo-
reign registers are not very convincing with respect 
to international jurisdiction issues related to IPRs. 
In summary, the effects of foreign judgments on the 
updating of national registers should be determined 
not by limiting ex ante the effects of the judgments 
of foreign courts on matters inscribed in these regis-
ters, but rather according to the usual PIL-relevant 
methods related to the recognition and enforcement 
of foreign judgments, i.a. the public policy reasons. 
So, national courts should be allowed to refuse to re-
cognise a foreign judgment on the validity of a na-
tional IPR whenever this judgment is against pub-
lic policy. However, it is likely that the public policy 
exception will be adopted in a restrictive way with 
regard to IP transnational litigation.199 
192 Interestingly enough this approach seems to be con-
firmed also by the Commentaries to the Transpa-
rency Proposal and to the ALI Principles. In fact, ac-
cording to the commentaries to the Transparency 
Proposal, their rejection of exclusive jurisdiction for 
foreign registered IPRs validity issues principally rai-
sed might lead to “cases where a foreign court has in-
ternational jurisdiction over actions concerning the 
validity of Japanese IP rights and invalidates those 
rights. But the Transparency Proposal provides, as 
a requirement for the recognition and enforcement 
of foreign judgment, that ‘the content of the judg-
ment and the courts proceedings are not contrary 
to the public policy in Japan’ in Article 402(3), and 
it is understood that non-application of the absolu-
tely mandatory statutes, the inconsistency of the 
rights situation with the country of registration, or 
the non-guaranteeing of an opportunity to pursue a 
claim about the validity and scope of rights may be 
contrary to public policy.”200 
193 The possible overcoming of the limitation of the ef-
fects of judgments on foreign IPRs validity issues 
seems to be purported also by the ALI Principles 
commentaries. In fact, interestingly enough those 
commentaries establish that “a mechanism for pu-
blic notification of inter se invalidity determinations 
would be a useful complement to the Principles as 
it would contribute to maintaining the public do-
main.”201 In other words, according to these com-
mentaries, even though the decision on foreign re-
gistered IPRs validity issues should have only inter 
partes effects, they could be notified to the entire 
world so that they could produce some sort of ef-
fect outside their limited scope. This approach is to 
be applauded. 
D. Conclusions
194 The comparison just exposed demonstrates that a 
trend exists in all sets of principles examined to mi-
tigate and even to overcome the territorial approach 
in cross-border IPRs litigation, allowing for the con-
solidation of claims even before courts other than 
the ones of the IPR granting State and even when 
the IPR validity issue is raised as a defense in an in-
fringement proceeding. Furthermore, the compa-
rison highlights that another trend exists in two of 
the four sets of principles at stake (the ALI Princip-
les and the Transparency Proposal) to reject exclu-
sive jurisdiction rules, allowing the consolidation 
of claims before courts other than the ones of the 
IPRs granting States even when the IPR validity is-
sue is raised as a principal claim. Thus, the compa-
rison explains that despite existing certain differen-
ces among the rules on infringement and exclusive 
jurisdiction posed (or rejected) by the four sets of 
academic principles, in the majority of cases further 
studies and work of the ILA Committee could help 
overcoming these differences, achieving common 
results, that could eventually be codified in a future 
ILA Resolution.
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